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Abstract
Cyclical Public Policy and Financial Factors
Vishrut Rana
The Great Recession of 2009 motivated a growing body of research on the
quantitative modeling of financial factors and appropriate policy responses.
This dissertation is a part of that line of research and looks at the quantitative
macroeconomic effects of financial factors on business cycles. The dissertation
uses quantitative macroeconomic general equilibrium models (popular dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)) that allow flexibility in micro-founded
modeling of macroeconomic environments. The dissertation captures financial
factors through explicit modeling of financial intermediation, featuring costly
state verification and collateral constraints as financial frictions.
The first chapter offers a new quantitative model of credit cycles with en-
dogenous leverage for financial intermediaries. Credit cycle dynamics emerge
in a model with endogenous financial intermediary leverage and costly state
verification. A trade-off between costly bank capital and a benefit of capital
as a buffer against adverse shocks drives intermediary leverage. Bank capi-
tal functions as a buffer by reducing value-at-risk. Bank capital is costly as
households require a premium to hold risky capital whereas deposits are in-
sured. Changes in intermediary balance sheet size drive credit supply. The
model displays three active credit channels: the business conditions channel,
the bank net worth channel, and the funding cost channel. The model delivers
3
empirically observed procyclical credit conditions.
The second chapter investigates how bank monitoring dynamics evolve over
the business cycle. The model features lognormal idiosyncratic productivity
shocks for firms and endogenous default thresholds with costly state verifica-
tion. The model presented in this chapter features financial intermediaries who
engage in risk-shifting over the business cycle by reducing monitoring activity
during business cycle upturns when the chances of loan losses are lower. Bank
monitoring is costly, but it can indirectly reduce loan default probabilities by
preventing firm moral hazard. As aggregate default probabilities fall over the
business cycle, the marginal benefit of loan monitoring drops. In addition,
intermediary monitoring is inefficiently low because firms holdup part of the
benefit of monitoring.
The third chapter abstracts from financial intermediation and looks at how
tax policy should vary across the business cycle in the presence of financial fric-
tions. Financial factors in the model give rise to heterogeneity among house-
holds. Optimal income tax rates are more volatile for lower income households.
The paper looks at the quantitative properties of Ramsey optimal income tax
rates as well as optimal public goods provision.
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Introduction
On October 3 2008, the US Department of the Treasury announced the begin-
ning of Troubled Asset Recovery Program (TARP) - an unprecedented fiscal
program that eventually spent US $431 billion to rescue the financial system.
Two systemically important financial institutions, Bear Sterns and Lehman
Brothers had collapsed. In the week preceding October 3, interbank lending
had stopped functioning, leaving many banks unable to access interbank fund-
ing at all. Subsequently banks faced criminal convictions for under-reporting
their true interbank borrowing costs. The breakdown in financial system fund-
ing led to an acute credit crunch that saw corporate lending spreads touch 9%
against a historical average of 3.4%. Global GDP shrunk by 5% between 2008
and 2009. In the US, the unemployment rate touched 10%. It would take an-
other 5 years before the US unemployment rate decreased to 6%. The financial
crisis of 2008 that originated in mortgage lending brought into renewed focus
the importance of financial intermediation in the economy. House prices fell,
wiping out the equity of house owners, and leaving mortgage loans in default.
Investors stopped purchasing mortgages in the secondary market so that banks
did not have funds for credit creation. This led to a severe credit crunch, and
resulted in diverse and extensive damage to other parts of the economy. Any
damage in the seemingly distant world of financial intermediation led to job
losses across the board - in all parts of society. This dissertation aims to study
this importance of financial factors and public policy in the business cycle.
Since the financial crisis there has been a lot of interest in quantitative mod-
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elling of financial factors. Recent work has taken several different approaches
to studying these. Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) model financial instabil-
ity created through financial frictions. They show that low risk environments
might result in greater systemic risk. In addition their model features benign
behavior in ‘normal’ times and large amplification of shocks during crisis times.
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) look at how loan losses in the presence of collateral
constraints on intermediaries can cause large disruptions in economic activity.
Gertler and Karadi (2011) examine the influence of monetary policy under
these conditions. Mendoza (2010) looks at occasionally binding collateral con-
straints and their effect in causing large economic disruptions. Bianchi (2012)
explores over-borrowing resulting from systemic externalities in lending mar-
kets. Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2014) model costly state verification
at intermediaries and show that increases in aggregate risk through increase in
volatility of idiosyncratic shocks can cause large and influential business cycle
fluctuations. They call these fluctuations in volatility ‘risk shocks’. Jermann
and Quadrini (2010) have a collateral constraint that directly influences firms?
labour decisions to explain partly the large drop in employment that happened
in the wake of the housing market collapse.
Several books and articles also explore the financial crisis of 2008 in more
qualitative depth. These accounts also look in closer detail at key events such
as the collapse of systemically important financial institutions that exacer-
bated the credit crunch. Rajan (2010) looks at how easy credit played a key
role in creating financial instability. Before the housing boom, Borio and Lowe
(2002) argued that financial instability was present in seemingly calm finan-
cial and macroeconomic environments. Paulson (2010) defends his actions as
then Secretary of the Treasury as events unfolded into a credit crises. Paulson,
Bernanke and their teams at the United States Department of the Treasury
and the Federal Reserve did prevent the credit crunch from becoming even
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worse. They managed that by limiting damage to the financial sector- extend-
ing unsecured credit, buying illiquid assets, and injecting equity in financial
institutions. Sorkin (2009) looks at how events unfolded during the critical
period in 2008 during which the financial sector sustained heavy damage. Gei-
thner (2014) gives the perspective of managing the financial crises while he
was Secretary of the Treasury from 2009 to 2013.
Figure 1 shows the interplay of financial conditions and the business cycle.
The figure shows that the US housing market and output co-move strongly.
The figure also shows that tighter financial conditions, represented by wider
corporate spreads, are negatively related to housing prices.
Further work remains to be done in quantitative modelling of financial in-
termediation. The first two chapters work along that line. The first chapter
offers a new quantitative model of credit cycles with endogenous leverage for
financial intermediaries. Changes in intermediary leverage influence the econ-
omy’s credit supply giving rise to empirically observed credit cycle features.
The model features three active credit channels, including a bank net worth
channel, a funding cost channel, and a business conditions channel. Many
recent quantitative financial friction models emphasize the net worth channel
of transmission. In its simplest form, a leveraged bank that experiences a
reduction in net worth must reduce assets causing fire sales and further net
worth reductions. While this channel is indeed highly influential, it is not the
only channel of credit cycle transmission. Standard collateral constraints do
not allow banks or firms to raise new equity while evidence presented in the
chapter shows that financial firms do raise external equity. This suggests that
models that only consider the net worth channel miss out on other influential
credit channels. Since banks in the model are able to decide their own capital
structure, the model de-emphasizes the bank net worth channel that is central
in standard credit or borrowing constraint models.
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Figure 1: The top panel shows the relation between de-trended house prices
and de-trended GDP per capita. There is strong co-movement between the
two. The lower panel shows the negative relation between credit spreads and
de-trended house prices.
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The second chapter investigates how bank monitoring dynamics evolve over
the business cycle. The model features lognormal idiosyncratic productivity
shocks for firms and endogenous default thresholds with costly state verifica-
tion. The model is in the line of established work on bank monitoring includ-
ing the seminal contribution of Diamond (1984). The marginal benefit of bank
monitoring drops during business cycle upturns and banks reduce their moni-
toring activity. This can increase volatility of consumption. In addition, bank
monitoring is inefficiently low as firms holdup part of the benefit from loan
monitoring. The two key contributions of this chapter are: i) modelling the
dynamic properties of bank monitoring incentives, and ii) endogenous default
thresholds that allow the model to endogenously track aggregate default rates
over the business cycle.
A significant cause of the 2007 United States housing bubble was the drive
to make housing affordable for lower income segments of society. While the
third chapter does not deal with housing, it does look at how fiscal policy
should be geared across different segments of society. The third chapter ab-
stracts from financial intermediation and looks at how tax policy should vary
across the business cycle in the presence of financial frictions. A key flashpoint
in the 2012 US election in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis was whether
richer households should contribute more in taxes for to support fiscal outlays
such as TARP. The paper describes properties of Ramsey-optimal marginal
income tax rates in response to productivity and fiscal spending shocks under
a set of conditions. Financial frictions in the model give rise to heterogeneity
among households. The chapter shows that behavior of optimal tax rates for
lower income households is quite different from optimal taxes for the wealthy.
Income tax rates are more volatile for lower income households. One way to
implement this would be through automatically stabilizing rebates that vary
over the business cycle.
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Financial factors remain central in the contemporary economic environ-
ment. Central banks around the world are competing to relax monetary policy
and undertake quantitative easing in the face of supply-driven disinflationary
pressures. Quoting from Borio and Lowe (2002),
“Widespread financial distress typically arises from the unwinding of finan-
cial imbalances that build up disguised by benign economic conditions... As a
result the financial cycle can amplify, and be amplified by, the business cycle.”
The subject of the first chapter is precisely this feedback between the fi-
nancial cycle and the business cycle, and the remaining dissertation explores
financial factors and public policy.
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Chapter 1
Credit Cycle Dynamics with
Costly Value-at-Risk
Chapter Abstract
Credit cycle dynamics emerge in a model with endogenous financial interme-
diary leverage and costly state verification. A trade-off between costly bank
capital and a benefit of capital as a buffer against adverse shocks drives inter-
mediary leverage. Bank capital functions as a buffer by reducing value-at-risk.
Bank capital is costly as households require a premium to hold risky capital
whereas deposits are insured. Changes in intermediary balance sheet size drive
credit supply. The model displays three active credit channels: the business
conditions channel, the bank net worth channel, and the funding cost channel.
The model delivers empirically observed procyclical credit conditions. (JEL
E32, G21, G32)1
1I would like to thank An Sungbae, Nicolas Jacquet, Hoon Hian Teck, and Phang Sock
Yong for valuable suggestions and discussions. I would like to thank conference participants
at the joint Econometric Society Australasian Meeting 2014 and Australian Conference of
Economists 2014, and at the joint European Meeting of the Econometric Society 2014 and
European Economics Association Conference 2014 for valuable questions and discussions.
An earlier version of this paper was titled ‘The Funding Gap in the Credit Cycle’
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1.1 Introduction
Interactions between financial intermediation and the macroeconomic environ-
ment may generate business cycle fluctuations. This credit cycle functions
via several channels. In their survey on financial intermediation, Gorton and
Winton (2003) distinguish between the broad lending channel, where business
conditions influence intermediaries, and the bank lending channel, where vari-
ations in intermediation activity influence the business cycle. Much of the
current literature on credit cycles emphasizes bank net worth channels. In
the literature, this channel typically features intermediaries with lending ac-
tivity constrained by their net worth. The key contribution of this paper is to
propose a new model of credit cycles with endogenous intermediary leverage
where three credit channels are simultaneously active.
There is some evidence of the interaction between credit conditions and the
business cycle. Figure 1 shows cyclical output per capita and the Federal Re-
serve’s Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey (SLOOS) from 1990Q2 to 2012Q3.
Shaded areas indicate NBER recessions. The graph shows the net percentage
of survey respondents who indicate they are tightening lending standards for
medium and large companies. The SLOOS numbers for small companies are
very similar. The figure shows that tightening credit conditions are associated
with contractions in cyclical output.
In order to look more quantitatively at the relation between credit and
business conditions, I run a vector auto-regression (VAR) of cyclical real output
per capita against the cyclical credit spread. The credit spread is the difference
between secondary market yields on BAA corporate bonds and US 3-month
treasuries. The spread is a measure of credit conditions, where a widening
credit spread indicates tighter credit conditions. Both the series are de-trended
using the HP filter for quarterly data. The data are from 1980Q1 to 2012Q3.
Figure 2 shows the impulse response of the VAR. The figure shows that spreads
15
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Figure 1.1: Tightening credit conditions associated with contraction in output
respond negatively to an output shock, which is a reflection of the business
conditions channel. The impulse responses also show that output responds
negatively to tighter credit conditions.
The model proposed here features endogenous intermediary leverage where
intermediaries are free to payout and raise capital. Figure 3 shows financial
business capital payouts over time using data from the Flow of Funds Ac-
counts. In models without endogenous leverage, the capital payout is always
0. Figure 3 shows that payouts are highly volatile and frequently negative, in-
dicating capital raising by financial businesses. This highlights the importance
of endogenous leverage in intermediation models.
I model the credit cycle using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model with financial intermediation. The role of intermediaries is to perform
a costly state verification following a default. Intermediaries can only recover
a portion of the defaulted firm’s assets. The non-recoverable portion is a
monitoring cost, or a bankruptcy cost. Each bank lends money to one firm by
combining capital with risk-free deposits. In the event of a default, the bank
faces a maximum loss where its outstanding deposit obligations are larger than
the recovered loan amount, and a deposit insurer meets this funding shortfall.
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Figure 1.2: VAR of GDP per capita and credit spreads
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Figure 1.3: Financial business capital payout is volatile
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Each bank pays a premium for this insurance, and the premium is convex in
the bank’s funding needs. This funding shortfall corresponds to the maximum
loss, i.e., the bank’s value-at-risk. When the capital cushion is greater, the
value-at-risk is lower and hence the insurance premium is lower. Thus, bank
capital in the model has value as a buffer against adverse times when the
bank holds defaulted loans. The bank is free to manage its funding structure
dynamically. Risk-averse households require a premium to hold bank capital
as it is wiped out in the event of a default. Banks prefer deposits for funding
the balance sheet because of deposit insurance and because capital requires
this premium return.
Changes in banks’ balance sheet sizes generate a credit cycle:
• Broad lending channel
1. Business conditions channel: An improvement in business condi-
tions improves recovery rates on collateral and reduces bank value-
at-risk. This leads to lower insurance premia and allows banks to
hold less capital and expand their balance sheets.
• Bank lending channel
2. Bank net worth channel: Bank net worth has a mixed effect in
the model. A greater capital cushion means lower value-at-risk and
hence lower insurance premia, so the bank can support a larger
balance sheet. On the other hand, capital is a costly way of finance
for banks, increasing required returns and hence contracting balance
sheets. Equilibrium bank leverage is optimal so that an increase or
decrease in capital would reduce welfare.
3. Funding cost channel: Higher funding costs of deposits mean banks
need more funds to support the same balance sheet size. This leads
to higher insurance premia and forces banks to contract balance
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sheets. In addition, higher nominal rates mean that households
require greater returns on their bank capital holding as well. Higher
net worth funding costs mean that the bank prefers to contract the
balance sheet leading to reduced credit supply.
The model does particularly well in matching empirical credit spread correla-
tion with output. In the data, credit spreads and output have a correlation of
-0.61, and the model-generated correlation is -0.76.
This paper is related to and draws from the extensive work on credit cycles
and financial features in business cycles. There are several approaches in the
literature for generating credit cycles. Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) use a net
worth channel where both banks and firms face moral hazard constraints. In
their framework, better-capitalized banks can monitor firms better, and firms
with less capital take more risk. Diamond and Rajan (2000) have a framework
where banks can threaten to withhold their loan collection skills and extract
rent from external equity holders. Higher deposits increase the threat of a
bank run in adverse times. When business conditions improve, there is lower
chance of distress and bank runs, and the banks can expand balance sheets.
The model in this paper is most closely related to Adrian and Shin (2010b) in
the Handbook of Monetary Economics. Adrian and Shin (2010b) have a value-
at-risk approach, where banks need to keep at least enough capital to cover the
maximum loss. The model in this paper features endogenous leverage where
the maximum loss may be greater than the capital banks hold. The model
in this paper hence moves away from the collateral constraint framework and
places less emphasis on the net worth channel of credit cycle transmission.
This paper is also related to recent dynamic financial friction literature.
A small sample of this literature includes Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist
(1999), Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2010), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2011),
Mendoza (2010), and Jermann and Quadrini (2012). Much of the literature
19
focuses on net worth channels. This paper proposes a model where capital
structure is flexible so that funding channels and business conditions channels
are more prominent.
Jermann and Quadrini (2012) look at the effects of financial shocks in the
business cycle. They allow for a dynamic capital structure for firms, who
choose equity payouts to maximize shareholder value. Endogenous leverage
emerges as firms balance tax benefits of debts versus a dynamic borrowing
constraint. Jermann and Quadrini (2012) abstract from intermediation and
introduce the financial shock as an exogenous disturbance in the borrowing
constraint parameter. The shock is a reflection of credit conditions, where a
tighter borrowing constraint indicates tougher access to credit. They show
that financing conditions are influential in the business cycle.
The remaining article is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model
and the calibration. Section 3 explores the credit channels active in the model
and looks briefly at the evidence of credit channels. Section 4 concludes.
1.2 Model
1.2.1 Households
There is a continuum of households mass 1. Each household may save using
either bank capital, nt, or risk-free bank deposits, dt. Each bank can lend to
one firm, and a fraction ω of firms default each period. If the firm defaults, the
lender bank’s capital is wiped out. Households are diversified across banks, so
they receive capital payouts from a fraction 1 − ω of banks. The household
chooses the bank capital to hold next period nt+1, deposits for next period dt+1,
labour hours ht to supply for the period, and consumption ct to maximize its
20
preferences. Households objective is to
max
{dt+1,nt+1,ht,ct}
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU (ct, ht)
subject to the period state-wise budget constraints
ct +
dt+1
rt
+ nt+1 = wtht +
dt
pit
+ (1− ω) divbtnt + τt (1.1)
where wt is the real wage, rt is the nominal risk-free interest rate, pit is inflation,
and divbt is the real bank capital payout rate. The quantity τt captures transfers
from the insurer and firms.
The resulting first order condition for deposits is
1 = Et
{
rt
pit+1
Λt,t+1
}
(1.2)
where Λt,t+1 is the household’s stochastic discount factor for real payoffs,
Λt,t+1 = β
U ′ct+1
U ′ct
Households can also choose to save in bank capital. If the bank holds a
good asset, it commits to payout its entire profits to households, who receive a
payment of divbtnt. If the bank holds a defaulted asset then the equity payout
from the bank is 0. Since each bank lends to one firm, a fraction ω of banks
hold defaulted assets. The first order condition for nt is
1 = Et
{
Λt,t+1 (1− ω) divbt+1
}
(1.3)
Here divb represents the household’s required payout rate on bank capital.
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The household also supplies labour to firms.
−U ′h = wtU ′c (1.4)
1.2.2 Banks and Public Deposit Insurance
A bank enters the period with nt as capital from the owner household, dt in
deposits, and outstanding loans bt. The bank commits to paying out its entire
profits, sbt . If the bank holds a non-defaulted asset, it collects interest and prin-
cipal payment from the firm, pays out depositors, pays an insurance premium,
and transfers remaining funds as distribution to the owner household. If on the
other hand the bank holds a defaulted asset, it transfers the recovered portion
of the loan as well as deposits to the public deposit insurer. The capital payout
in that case is 0. Banks do not diversify the default risk across firms.
The bank has capital collateral equal to the principal amount bt/zt−1, where
zt is the interest rate on loans. If the event of a firm default, the bank recovers
a fraction µqt of the collateral, where qt is the real price of capital. The bank
still owes depositors dt/pit, and hence the bank faces a maximum loss (value-at-
risk) equal to (dt/pit)−µqt (bt/zt−1). The deposit insurer receives the recovered
collateral value and the deposits, and meets payments to depositors. In return
for this insurance service the insurer collects a premium from banks. This
costly insurance is central in this model. It captures a buffer value of capital
for banks. The premium is convex in the expected value-at-risk, and takes the
functional form φjγt , where φ and γ are parameters, and jt is defined as the
value-at-risk per unit asset,
jt =
{
(dt/pit)− µqt (bt/zt−1)
bt
}
(1.5)
jt is a key variable in the model. It is a measure of intermediary risk. This
model has multiple credit channels because several different variables affect
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the value-at-risk. Improved business conditions raise qt and reduce jt, higher
risk-free interest rates raise dt and raise jt, higher nt reduces jt, and a greater
asset size bt does not affect jt unless intermediary leverage changes.
The parameter γ governs the insurance premium elasticity of jt. When
jt rises by 1%, the insurance premium rises by γ%. Greater elasticity of the
premium means that the buffer value of capital is more volatile, and so bank
leverage is also more volatile.
Banks prefer financing with deposits rather than capital. Deposit insurance
makes deposits attractive to banks, whereas households require greater returns
on capital making capital costly. On the other hand, the insurance premium is
lower when the bank has more capital cushion. Banks balance between these
effects to choose their capital structure. Figure 4 shows the intuition for the
bank’s capital structure decision. The insurance premium captures the role of
bank capital as a buffer against adverse times when the bank holds a defaulted
loan. Endogenous leverage emerges in the model as banks balance this buffer
value of capital against the capital funding cost.
Spreads arise in this model because of the insurance premium, and because
capital financing is more costly than risk-free deposits. Intermediaries pass
some cost of the insurance premium to borrowers in the form of higher spreads.
Intermediaries combine capital and deposits from households to lend bt+1/zt
to firms. This is the bank’s balance sheet constraint,
bt+1
zt
= nt+1 +
dt+1
rt
(1.6)
The bank’s leverage is equal to the assets over the bank capital,
levb = bt+1
ztnt+1
When it holds a non-defaulted asset, the bank receives a nominal payment
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Figure 1.4: Intuition of the bank’s capital holding decision
This graph shows the capital decision of the bank holding prices and other allocations
constant. The vertical axis is in consumption units. mbn and mcn refer to the
marginal benefit and marginal cost of bank net worth respectively. The marginal
cost of net worth can be viewed as being fixed at rt taking prices as given. This
is because the bank pays out rt/ (1− ω) but with a probability (1− ω). mbn is
zt + ∂ (φjγt ) /∂nt. Each additional unit of capital reduces the payable insurance
premium. While jt is positive and γ > 1, mbn is downward sloping. In addition,
when γ > 2, mbn is convex. The marginal cost of deposits is lower as the insurer
pays depositors in the event of default.
bt from firms, and it pays out dt to depositors, and pays out the insurance
premium. The bank’s real profit sbt is given by
sbt =
bt
pit
− dt
pit
− φjγt (1.7)
A bank that holds defaulted assets simply transfers liabilities and assets
to the insurer and continues business as normal in the following period. The
bank maximizes lifetime profits, subject to the balance sheet constraint (6),
and the bank profit equation (7).
max
{nt+1,dt+1,bt+1}
E0
∞∑
t=0
Λ0,t (1− ω) sbt
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Since the bank commits to payout all its profits, we have
sbt = divbtnt (1.8)
The resulting first order condition for credit supply can be expressed in
terms of the credit spread, zt − rt,
zt − rt = γφj
γ−1
t (rtbt+1 − ztdt+1)
b2t+1
(1.9)
This condition says that credit supply expands (spreads tighten) when jt drops.
When the premium is elastic and γ is high, the credit supply shifts farther in
response to shifts in jt.
The public insurer receives the premium payment from the 1 − ω banks
that are solvent, and it also takes over assets and liabilities from the distressed
banks. This means it pays out deposits for the banks with defaulted assets.
The insurer can transfer lump-sum amounts to households to meet any excess
or shortfall from the transactions. I assume that there is no moral hazard
between the insurer and the insolvent bank, so that the bank collects on the
defaulted loan. The insurance premium penalizes banks for maintaining a
lower capital cushion. In this sense the insurer may be viewed as a regulator
who discourages banks from keeping a fragile capital structure.
ξt = (1− ω)φjγt − ω
(
dt
pit
− µqt bt
zt−1
)
(1.10)
where ξt is a lump-sum transfer to households.
1.2.3 Capital Owner Firms
There is a continuum of capital owner firms with mass 1. They borrow from
banks to purchase capital, which they lease out to intermediate good producer
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firms. A fraction ω of capital owner firms default each period. If a firm defaults,
all the capital income for the period is lost and the lender bank takes control
of the firm’s capital. There is no other default penalty and the firm functions
as normal the following period. A capital owner firm solves
max
{kt+1,bt+1}
E0
∞∑
t=0
Λ0,t (1− ω)
(
rkt kt + (1− δ) qtkt −
bt
pit
)
rkt represents the real capital rental rate, δ is the capital depreciation rate, and
bt/pit is the real loan payment to banks. The firm’s balance sheet constraint is
qtkt+1 =
bt+1
zt
(1.11)
where bt+1/zt is the loan principal.
The firm takes rkt and zt as given, and the associated first order condition
for credit demand is
rkt+1 + (1− δ) qt+1 = qt
zt
pit+1
(1.12)
1.2.4 Goods Producer Firms
Goods production in the model follows a standard setup. The final good in
the economy, Yt is a composite of intermediate goods yi,t,
Yt =
(ˆ 1
0
y
1− 1

i,t di
)1/(1− 1 )
(1.13)
The final good producers solve
max
yi,t
{
PtYt −
ˆ 1
0
pi,tyi,tdi
}
where Pt is the aggregate price index and pi,t is the price of an intermediate
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good yi, t. This gives the demand for intermediate goods,
yi,t =
(
pi,t
Pt
)−
Yt (1.14)
Final goods producers are perfectly competitive, so the aggregate price index
is
Pt =
(ˆ 1
0
p1−i,t di
)1/(1−)
(1.15)
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive intermediate good
producers indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Prices are sticky and a fraction 1− θ of firms
can reset their prices in a period. The production technology has a Cobb-
Douglas form,
yi,t = Atkαi,th1−αi,t (1.16)
Here At represents the aggregate total factor productivity (TFP), which
follows an AR(1) process with a shock νA,
ln (At) = ρAln (At−1) + νA (1.17)
The intermediate good producer firm tries to maximize the lifetime value
of profits, which are distributed to households.
max
pi,t,ki,t,hi,t
Et
∞∑
t=0
θtΛ0,t
(
pi,tyi,t
Pt
− rkt ki,t − wthi,t
)
subject to the demand constraint (14) and the production technology (16).
The associated real marginal cost is
mct =
rkt
αAtk
α−1
i,t h
1−α
i,t
(1.18)
mct =
wt
(1− α)Atkαi,th−αi,t
(1.19)
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The homogeneous production technology means that marginal cost for all firms
is identical at mct.
The first order condition for firms is
E0
∞∑
t=0
Λ0,tθt
(
p∗i,t
Pt
)−1−
Yt
(
mct − − 1

p∗i,t
Pt
)
= 0 (1.20)
All firms that re-optimize prices in the period choose the same price, so that
p∗i,t = p∗t . Following Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007), I express this first order
condition recursively with non-zero inflation in steady state, and track the
price dispersion cost ιt.
ιt = (1− θ)P ∗t − + θpi−ιt−1 (1.21)
Equation (15) gives the price evolution equation,
1 = pi−1+t + (1− α)P ∗t 1− (1.22)
where P ∗t is p∗t/Pt.
1.2.5 Capital Goods Producer Firm
The capital goods producer buys existing capital from the market at price qt,
makes new capital using old capital and goods, and then sells it. Capital goods
production is subject to flow investment adjustment costs. The firm solves
max
Kt+1
E0
∞∑
t=0
Λ0,t
(
qtIt − It
[
1 + F
(
It
It−1
)])
The law of motion of capital gives It,
Kt+1 = ((1− δ) (1− ω) + ωµ)Kt + It (1.23)
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Capital from the non-defaulted capital owners depreciates at the rate δ, and
banks can only recover a fraction µ of capital from defaulted firms.
The first order condition for capital production is given by
qt = 1 + F
(
It
It−1
)
+ ItF ′It
(
It
It−1
)
+ Λt,t+1It+1F ′It
(
It+1
It
)
(1.24)
1.2.6 Monetary Policy and Equilibrium
The monetary authority follows a smoothed Taylor rule,
ln
(
rt
r∗
)
= Φrln
(
rt−1
r∗
)
+ (1− Φr)
[
Φpiln
(
pit
pi∗
)
+ Φyln
(
yt
y∗
)]
+ ςt (1.25)
The starred variables represent steady states, and ςt is an exogenous stochastic
process,
ςt = ρςςt−1 + νς (1.26)
where νς is a monetary policy shock.
Aggregation for the final good gives
Yt = Ct + It
(
1 + F
(
It
It−1
))
(1.27)
After accounting for price dispersion, the aggregate output is given by
Yt =
(
AtK
α
t H
1−α
t
) 1
ιt
(1.28)
Competitive equilibrium for the economy is the set of processes {ct , ht,
divt, rt, pit, zt, qt, jt, sbt , ξt, rkt , wt, mct, Yt, P ∗t , It, kt+1, bt+1, dt+1, nt+1, ιt}∞t=0
that satisfy equations (2) - (12), (18)- (25), (27), and (28), given k0, b0, d0, n0,
ι−1, and the exogenous stochastic processes {At}∞t=0 and {ςt}∞t=0.
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1.2.7 Calibration
I calibrate steady state inflation to 0.5% per quarter. I calibrate the time
discount factor β to 0.996 to give a nominal risk-free rate of 3.7% annually in
steady state. The production parameter α is set to 0.36, and the depreciation
parameter δ is 0.025. The values for the intermediate goods firms are in stan-
dard ranges - the CES parameter  is 6, and price stickiness parameter θ is
0.75.
The utility functional form is separable in labor and consumption with the
following form, where I calibrate η to 1, and χ to 7.69 to get steady state h
equal to 0.3 in steady state.
U (ct, ht) = log (ct)− χ h
1+η
t
1 + η
Following Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), the investment ad-
justment cost function has a flow specification
F
(
It
It−1
)
= κ2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
where κ is set to 2.48.
TFP shock persistence ρA is 0.95 and the shock standard deviation σA is
0.007. Monetary shock persistence ρς is 0.5 and standard deviation σς is 0.0025.
I calibrate the monetary policy rule parameters Φr, Φpi, and Φy to 0.75, 2.4,
and 0 respectively. These values for shocks and policy rule parameters are in
line with estimates in Smets and Wouters (2007).
The default parameter ω is calibrated to 0.011 and the recovery parameter
µ to 0.65. The value for µ is comparable to the long run average recovery rate
on loans given default, according to data from the 2010 Moody’s default study2.
2Moody’s Investor Service. (2011) Corporate Default and Recovery Rates, 1920:2010.
Moody’s
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The parameter ω is higher than comparable values in the literature. The long
run annual default rate for speculative grade companies is a bit higher than
4% based on default studies from the credit rating agencies, so the average
economy-wide marginal default rate may be a bit lower. Coupled with the
recovery rate µ the parametrization is moderate.
The financial parameters φ and γ are specific to this model. γ governs
the elasticity of the insurance premium to the value-at-risk, jt, and φ is the
insurance cost scale parameter. γ and φ are calibrated simultaneously to match
target steady state spread and intermediary leverage. The target quarterly
steady state spread is 0.84%, which is the long run average spread between
secondary market yields of BAA corporate bonds and US 3 month treasuries.
The target steady state bank leverage is 12. This is the average leverage
for commercial banks since 1980 based on data from the Federal Reserve’s
H8 release. Commercial bank leverage has trended downwards significantly
over time, especially since the 1990s. However, leverage for shadow banks
and capital market intermediaries is much higher than commercial banks as
discussed in Adrian and Shin (2010a). γ and φ are set to 3.636 and 7.14
respectively. Table 1 summarizes the calibration.
Table 2 shows selected moments from the model. The model does well in
matching correlation between spreads and output. The empirical correlation
of spreads and output is -0.6, compared to -0.76 in the model. While the model
has volatile spreads, empirically spreads are even more volatile.
1.3 Credit Channels
Endogenous Leverage
We can derive the bank’s capital structure decision in the model. Re-writing
the bank’s profit equation (7) after using the balance sheet condition (6) and
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Table 1.1: Calibration
Parameter Description Value
pi∗ inflation 1.005
β intertemporal discount 0.996
α intermediate good production 0.36
δ depreciation 0.025
 final goods CES production 6
θ price stickiness 0.75
η inverse labour supply elasticity 1
χ labour utility 7.69
κ investment adjustment cost 2.48
ρA TFP shock persistence 0.95
ρς Monetary shock persistence 0.5
σA TFP standard deviation 0.007
σς Monetary shock standard deviation 0.0025
Φr Taylor rule smoothing 0.75
Φpi Taylor rule inflation 2.4
Φy Taylor rule output 0
ω default rate 0.011
µ recovery rate 0.65
γ insurance premium elasticity 3.636
φ insurance premium scale 7.14
the payout equation (8) gives
nt
(
divbt −
rt−1
pit
)
= bt
pit
(
zt − rt
zt
)
− φjγt
We further manipulate the equation using the household Euler equations and
the credit supply equation (9). The resulting expression is shifted one period
forward to give the capital asset ratio,
nt+1
bt+1
= Et
{ −pit+1 (1− ω)φjγt+1
rtbt+1ω − (1− ω) rtφγjγ−1t+1
}
(1.29)
This expression gives
∂ (nt+1/bt+1)
∂rt
= −(nt+1/bt+1)
rt
A rise in interest rates increases the opportunity cost of bank capital, and
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Table 1.2: Moments
spread zt Total
credit
Bank
capital
Invest-
ment
Correlation with
output
Data -0.608 -0.224 0.209 0.483 0.813
Model -0.764 -0.739 0.822 0.621 0.869
Volatility relative
to output
Data 24.5 0.12 1.86 3.76 4.75
Model 8.28 0.15 0.87 2.62 2.23
Note: Output, total credit, bank capital, and investment are in real per capita terms, logged
and de-trended using the HP-filter. zt is the de-trended BAA yield. Total credit is the credit
outstanding to non-financial business. Bank capital is net assets for commercial banks. Data
from the Federal Reserve and BEA.
banks respond by increasing leverage. Figure 5 shows the VAR of interest
rates and the capital-asset ratio of commercial banks. Following an interest
rate shock, capital asset ratios seem to rise initially and then fall. This might
be a reflection of adjustment costs in capital structure for intermediaries.
∂ (nt+1/bt+1)
∂jt+1
= γφ (1− ω) pit+1jγ−1t+1 rt
(
−bt+1ω + φjγ−1t+1 (1− ω)
)
∂ (nt+1/bt+1) /∂jt+1 > 0 in the baseline calibration. However, it can be negative
if default rates ω are high so that fewer banks pay the insurance premium.
∂ (nt+1/bt+1) /∂jt+1 increases with φ, rt, and jt+1.
The costly value-at-risk approach in this model looks at changes in credit
supply and the effects on the business cycle. Figure 6 shows some evidence
of the role of credit supply. The figure shows the impulse response from a
VAR of lending rates and total credit outstanding. Lending rates are de-
trended secondary market BAA yields, and total credit is de-trended total
credit outstanding to non-financial business. The figure shows that higher
lending rates are associated with reduction in credit outstanding. This implies
that credit supply conditions are particularly influential during contractions in
credit.
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Figure 1.5: VAR of detrended interest rates and de-trended capital-asset ratio
for commercial banks. Data for the capital asset ratio derived from the Federal
Reserve’s H8 release for commercial banks. Interest rates are secondary market
yields on US 3-month treasuries. Capital asset ratios rise and then fall following
an interest rate shock.
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Figure 1.6: VAR of lending rates and total credit outstanding. Credit supply
conditions influential in credit contraction as total credit drops following a lending
rate shock.
34
One of the key drivers of the credit channels in the model is equation (9),
which governs the credit supply. Equation (9) is shown here for convenience:
zt − rt = γφj
γ−1
t (rtbt+1 − ztdt+1)
b2t+1
From equation (9), we have
∂ (zt − rt)
∂jt
= (zt − rt) (γ − 1) 1
jt
> 0
When the value-at-risk per unit asset, jt, rises, the credit spread rises and banks
supply less credit. This is because intermediaries’ marginal costs for insurance
premium rise. Intermediaries also have to hold more capital to offset the rise
in premium, so their marginal funding costs rise. Due to the convexity of
insurance premia, the effect is larger if the spreads are large to begin with.
1.3.1 Broad Lending Channel
Business Conditions Channel
An improvement in business conditions increases the willingness of interme-
diaries to lend. In this model the business conditions channel works prin-
cipally through asset prices qt. The credit supply condition (9) shows that
∂ (zt − rt) /∂qt is negative and so the credit supply increases in qt.
Consider a TFP shock to look at the business conditions channel. A shock
that improves TFP increases the demand for credit as measured by a rise in rk
and a boom in investment. Asset prices rise, driving down the maximum loss,
reflecting an improvement in collateral conditions. The insurance premium
drops, and banks can afford to expand the balance sheet using deposits, the
cheaper funding source. This drives down spreads.
The monetary authority responds to the TFP shock by reducing the nom-
inal rate rt, triggering the funding cost channel. A drop in divb means that
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Figure 1.7: Response to 0.7% (1 standard deviation) TFP shock
capital is cheaper and hence banks can afford to keep more capital and drive
the insurance premium further down. The net effect is that the bank expands
the credit supply. Firms can afford to borrow more resulting in an amplified
boom in investment. Figure 7 shows the summary impulse response for a TFP
shock. For comparison, I show the same model with φ set to 0. When insur-
ance is costless in this way, the optimal bank capital is 0, the credit spread is
0 too, and the credit channels are closed.
I look at the aggregate level empirical evidence for a link between asset
prices and credit supply conditions. I run a VAR of the de-trended S&P 500
index and de-trended credit spreads. The VAR shows that credit spreads
tighten when asset prices rise. Figure 8 shows the impulse response of the
VAR.
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Figure 1.8: VAR of detrended asset prices and de-trended credit spreads. A rise in
asset prices leads to tighter spreads, showing the asset price channel is active.
1.3.2 Bank Lending Channel
Bank Net Worth Channel
Bank net worth has an ambiguous effect in the model. Capital is a costly
way of financing bank assets, but it also reduces the insurance premium and
hence marginal lending costs. Equilibrium capital is optimal in the model so
that there is no welfare gain from increasing or decreasing capital levels. One
situation where more capital would improve welfare is if banks overestimate
their loan recovery rate µqtbt−1/zt−1.
At the aggregate level, cyclical bank capital changes do not seem to affect
spreads. Figure 9 shows the VAR of bank capital per capita and credit spreads.
Bank capital data is obtained from the Federal Reserve H8 Release using data
for all commercial banks. Several studies look at the effect of bank capital on
lending activity. Gambacorta and Mistrulli (2004) find that better capitalized
banks can absorb temporary GDP shocks better, consistent with the model in
the paper. Lown and Morgan (2006) also find that bank capital does not appear
to affect standards, which is consistent with the results here. They argue that
book value of capital may not be the ideal measure for bank capital.
37
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
2 4 6 8 10
Net worth shock
N
e
t w
o
rth
 
re
sp
o
n
se
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
.04
2 4 6 8 10
Spread shock
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
.20
2 4 6 8 10
Sp
re
a
d 
re
sp
o
n
se
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
.20
2 4 6 8 10
Figure 1.9: VAR of detrended bank capital and de-trended credit spreads
Funding Cost Channel
The household Euler equations imply that divbt is related to rt,
Et
{
(1− ω) divbt+1U ′ct+1
}
= Et
rtU
′
ct+1
pit+1
This means that when the real interest rate rises, the required return on capital,
divbt , also rises. Banks pass on this increase in funding costs to firms. Inter-
mediaries’ profitability is eroded and they respond by charging higher spreads
to borrowers,. In addition, there is a secondary effect as the real value-at-risk
rises and jt rises. This increases the funding costs and forces banks to rein
in credit supply. The result is higher spreads and lower investment. The rise
in required returns also increases the average cost of capital. If nt remains
the same, banks need to make more profit to distribute the required return
according to the profit equation (7) and profit distribution (8). This causes
banks to hold less capital following the increase in rt.
Figure 10 shows the effect of a monetary policy shock νς with size 0.0025.
The size of the shock is one standard deviation, estimated in Smets and
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Figure 1.10: Response to one standard deviation monetary policy shock
Wouters (2007) and other related studies. It implies that if inflation is con-
stant, the nominal rate would rise by 0.25%. The relatively small shock size
induces small movements in most variables except the spread, which rises by
more than 5%. The steady state spread is 84 basis points, so a 5% rise trans-
lates to a less than 5 basis point move in the credit spread. Such a move is
modest in comparison to empirical spread volatility.
Some empirical work investigates funding channels for banks. Kishan and
Opiela (2000), for instance, find that monetary policy effects are largest for
small banks with lower capital buffers. Marginal funding costs for banks are
not apparent as banks may use a variety of funding methods with different
durations.
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1.4 Conclusion
This paper proposes a model of credit cycles where three credit channels are
simultaneously active. More capital reduces intermediaries’ maximum loss re-
sulting in lower costs for insurance premia. This feature captures bank capital’s
role as a buffer against adverse shocks. Capital is costly because household de-
sire compensation for the extra risk of holding capital versus risk free deposits,
and intermediaries prefer funding using deposits because of deposit insurance.
Changes in the value-at-risk and cost of capital through the different channels
shift the amount banks are willing to lend.
I show that capital payouts for financial businesses are volatile indicating
the need to consider endogenous leverage in financial intermediation models.
I also present some evidence of the credit channels. I show using a vector
auto-regression that credit conditions improve over the business cycle (i.e.
they are procyclical). In addition, total credit outstanding drops when lend-
ing rates rise, indicating that credit supply is particularly influential in credit
crunches. At the aggregate level, bank net worth does not seem to influence
credit spreads. Evidence from VARs shows that a rise in asset prices improves
credit conditions, indicating the business conditions channel is active.
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Chapter 2
Bank Monitoring Dynamics and
Inefficiency Over the Business
Cycle
Chapter Abstract
How does bank monitoring evolve over the business cycle? The model pre-
sented in this paper features financial intermediaries who engage in risk-shifting
over the business cycle by reducing monitoring activity during business cycle
upturns when the chances of loan losses are lower. The model environment
features firm-specific productivity shocks with endogenous default thresholds.
Bank monitoring is costly, but it can indirectly reduce loan default probabil-
ities by preventing firm moral hazard. As aggregate default probabilities fall
over the business cycle, the marginal benefit of loan monitoring drops. In ad-
dition, intermediary monitoring is inefficiently low because firms holdup part
of the benefit of monitoring.
JEL codes: E32, G21, D61
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2.1 Introduction
A key function of financial intermediaries is to act as delegated monitors for
lending on behalf of diversified depositors. The cost of loan monitoring may be
too high for individual savers to engage in direct finance of firms’ borrowing,
and so they rely on banks to pool savings from many agents, finance borrowing,
and monitor loans. The bank has private incentives to monitor loans since
depositors do not observe bank monitoring activity. This paper looks at how
the business cycle influences banks’ incentives for monitoring. Banks’ incentive
for monitoring in the model arises because default is costly and monitoring
loans can indirectly reduce the probability of default. Banks risk-shift over
the business cycle by choosing to spend less on monitoring during good times
when aggregate default probabilities are lower.
The model combines costly state verification following default (introduced
by Townsend (1979)) with costly loan monitoring as in Diamond (1984). Firms
are ex-ante identical but receive a log-normally distributed idiosyncratic shock
within the period. Firms that receive shocks below an endogenous threshold
go into default as they cannot meet their debt obligations, and the lending
bank incurs a state verification default cost. Firms also have a moral hazard
where they receive an opportunity within the period to divert a fraction of
production. A banker can prevent the firm from taking this opportunity if she
monitors the firm by incurring a monitoring cost. A firm that has diverted
some of its production is more likely to default, so that the banker can save
on loan default costs by choosing to monitor the firm. Following an aggregate
improvement, firms are in general less likely to default, so that the marginal
benefit of bank monitoring is lower, and banks monitor less.
The model also features a holdup problem. Banks only receive some frac-
tion of output as loan payment as firms holdup the remaining output. Consider
a standard Cobb-Douglas production function, f (Kt, Ht) = AtKαt H1−αt where
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K is capital, H is labour hours, and f (Kt, Ht) is output. If competitive ho-
mogenous firms borrow to finance 100% of their capital purchase, then the loan
repayment would be the capital share of output, f ′k (Kt, Ht)Kt = αf (Kt, Ht) .
The firm holds up the remaining share of output, and so when the bank chooses
the monitoring activity it takes into consideration the benefit from saving
αf (Kt, Ht) rather than f (Kt, Ht). This results in inefficiently low monitoring
activity.
This paper is related to the large literature on bank monitoring as surveyed
in Gorton and Winton (2003). The paper shares the established intuition
on bank monitoring with several papers including Berglo¨f and von Thadden
(1994), Gorton and Kahn (2000), Longhofer and Santos (2000), Park (2000),
and Rajan and Winton (1995). These studies look at different aspects of bank
monitoring. The model in this paper shares the intuition that arises in these
papers - the returns to loan-monitoring are greatest in bad states. This paper
is closely related to Winton (1999). He argues that banks can risk-shift by
monitoring less because depositors cannot observe bank monitoring activity
in a timely fashion. He argues that while banks may commit to diversifying
their loan portfolio, it is more difficult for them to commit to monitoring. The
feature that banks cannot commit to monitoring loans is also an important
part of the current model. The two key contributions in this paper are
(i) The model tracks the business cycle dynamics of banks’ incentives to
monitor loans.
(ii) Endogenous default thresholds within the model allow us to track the
dynamics of aggregate default rates.
This paper is also related to the dynamic financial intermediation literature.
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) incorporated costly state verification
into a DSGE environment to generate a credit cycle. Christiano et al (2014)
features a model with costly state verification, idiosyncratic firm productivity
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shocks, and firm leverage to study the effect of ‘risk shocks’ on the business
cycle. I abstract from both firms’ and banks’ capital structure. In particular,
neither banks nor firms have access to internal funds. This paper focuses
on costly bank monitoring dynamics where costly state verification gives the
incentive for banks to monitor. There has been a lot of interest in bank risk-
shifting arising due to expansive monetary policy (Jime´nez, Ongena, Peydro´,
and Saurina (2014) and the references therein), but less interest in background
intermediary risk-shifting over the business cycle.
Default rates tend to be counter-cyclical. Aggregate improvements in busi-
ness conditions mean that firms do well and are less likely to go into default.
Figure 1 shows speculative grade corporate bond annual default rates from
1952 - 2010 (bond default data from Moody’s). The model also generates
counter-cyclical default rates for all firms with endogenous default thresholds.
Bank monitoring is largely unobservable. Central banks around the world
now conduct credit standards surveys, such as the Federal Reserve’s Senior
Loan Officer Opinion Survey (SLOOS), and the ECB’s Bank Lending Survey.
Surveys include information on net percentage of banks tightening terms on
lending to firms. Terms may give a very rough idea about potential monitoring
activity. Figure 2 shows net percentage of banks tightening loan covenants
terms to firms. The contemporaneous correlation with cyclical output is -0.17.
The net percentage of banks tightening terms is strongly positively correlated
with net percentage of banks tightening lending standards.
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 outlines the baseline
model and the model. Section 3 gives the model calibration and the baseline
results on bank monitoring over the business cycle. Section 4 looks at the
influence of dynamic monitoring on the business cycle. Section 5 examines the
holdup problem to show that bank monitoring in the model is inefficiently low,
and finally section 6 concludes.
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2.2 Model
2.2.1 Households
There is a continuum of households of unit mass who maximize lifetime dis-
counted consumption utility. I abstract from the labour supply decision.
Households can save in risk-free bank deposits, dt+1, earning an interest rate
rt. Each household owns a firm and receive profits from the firm, Πft , each
period. In addition, one member from each household is a banker who returns
her profits, Πbt , to the household. The representative household’s problem is
max
ct,dt+1
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU (ct)
subject to the period budget constraint
ct +
dt+1
rt
≤ Πft + Πbt + dt
where ct is consumption and β is the household’s intertemporal discount pa-
rameter. The standard intertemporal first order condition for households is
1 = βEtU
′ (ct+1)
U ′ (ct)
rt (2.1)
2.2.2 Firms and Banks
At the end of the period, firms borrow funds from banks at an interest rate
zt to purchase capital for next period. The loan amount is bt+1 and capital
purchased is kt+1. Firms are ex-ante identical as they buy homogenous capital
goods from competitive capital goods-producers, and at the end of each period
they sell the undepreciated capital goods back to capital goods-producers. In
the absence of adjustment costs of capital or similar frictions, the price of
capital goods is equal to the consumption good price. The loan market clearing
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condition is
kt+1 =
bt+1
zt
(2.2)
Within the period firms receive an idiosyncratic shock ωt, which follows a
log-normal distribution with parameters ω¯ and σω,
ln (ωt) ∼ N (ω¯, σω)
Head, Mayer, and Thoenig (2014) argue that the log-normal distribution fits
the actual firm sales distribution. The loan market is incomplete in the sense
that the repayment amount bt does not depend on the realization of the firm’s
idiosyncratic shock ωt. This means that firms that receive too low an idiosyn-
cratic shock will default. In the event of a default, banks take over the firm’s
production and capital for the period, but the firm faces no other penalty for
defaulting. If the firm does not default, it repays the loan, bt, to the bank and
pays out profits Πft to the household.
In addition to the idiosyncratic shock, firms also receive an opportunity
to divert a proportion (1− ξ) of production during the period, 0 < ξ < 1.
Banks can prevent this moral hazard by choosing to monitor the firms. Bank
monitoring is costly, so that the bank incurs a monitoring cost µ for each
firm monitored. At the time of making the loan, bt+1, the bank decides the
aggregate proportion of firms to monitor, pt+1. However, the bank does not
decide the specific firms it will monitor during the period. This is due to a
commitment problem. The bank cannot commit at the time of lending that
it will not monitor a loan. If the firm believes before-hand that it will not
be monitored, then firm owners expect a proportion (1− ξ) of output will be
diverted. The firm will hence choose to hold less capital to get higher marginal
return on capital. During the period, however, before the opportunity to divert
production arises, the bank can monitor the firm and prevent the moral hazard.
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The bank would benefit through a lower default rate. Due to this commitment
problem banks and firms at time of lending only know the aggregate fraction
of firms that the bank will monitor. During the period the bank randomly
picks firms to monitor such that the aggregate proportion of monitored firms
is consistent. The bank’s incentive to monitor some loans comes from the
reduced costs arising from loan default due to a lower aggregate default rate.
If on the other hand the bank was able to commit to not monitoring firms,
it would lend bmt+1 to monitored firms and bnt+1 to non-monitored firms and
then choose to monitor no firms. The banker would simply charge an interest
rate that compensates her for the increased default risk and then diversify
across all firms. This way the bank saves on all monitoring costs. Due to
the commitment problem the bank is forced to lend bt+1 at identical terms to
all firms, so that all firms hold the same capital ex-ante, kt+1. In period t a
monitored firm therefore produces
ωtAtk
α
t
where At is an aggregate factor productivity shock. A non-monitored firm
produces
ωtξAtk
α
t
A monitored firm defaults if it cannot meet debt obligations - specifically, a
monitored firm defaults if it receives a shock ω < ω˜m where ω˜m is such that
ω˜mt Atk
α
t + (1− δ) kt = bt
The probability of default for a monitored firm is then F (ω˜m) where F (·) is
the cdf of ω. The default threshold for non-monitored firms is such that
ω˜nt ξAtk
α
t + (1− δ) kt = bt
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Using the loan market clearing condition, the default thresholds are
ω˜mt = k1−αt (zt−1 − (1− δ))
1
At
(2.3)
ω˜nt = k1−αt (zt−1 − (1− δ))
1
Atξ
(2.4)
so that the relative default threshold between monitored and non-monitored
threshold is constant, ω˜mt = ξω˜nt .
The ‘excess default rate’, F (ω˜nt ) − F (ω˜mt ), is a proxy for the benefit to
the bank for monitoring a loan. If the banker monitors the loan, she can re-
duce the default rate from F (ω˜nt ) to F (ω˜mt ), and incur reduced loan default
costs. Following a positive aggregate shock, both default thresholds shift left,
as shown in figure 3. Since the default thresholds proportional, the probability
of default for a non-monitored firm, F (ω˜nt ), falls more than the probability
of default for a monitored firm, F (ω˜mt ). The model predicts that the excess
default is counter-cyclical, and this model feature drives the result that bank
monitoring activity is counter-cyclical. The marginal benefit of bank monitor-
ing drops during business cycle upturns, while the marginal cost is constant.
Default rates are countercyclical in the model, so default thresholds rise in
recessions. The countercyclical excess default in the model hence requires that
excess default rises when the default threshold rises,
∂ (F (ω˜nt )− F (ξω˜nt ))
ω˜nt
> 0⇒ f (ω˜nt )− ξf (ξω˜nt ) > 0
The pdf of the idiosyncratic shock has to satisfy the above condition to have
countercyclical excess default. As the degree of moral hazard increases, ξ
becomes smaller, and the restriction on the shock distribution is reduced.
There is some empirical support for a counter-cyclical excess default rate.
One way to proxy the excess default rate is to take the difference in delinquency
rates between credit card loans (risky) and consumer loans (less risky). Credit
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card loans serve as a rough proxy for high default rate non-monitored loans,
and consumer loans serve as proxy for lower default rated monitored loans.
Banks would have an idea of the purpose and client background for consumer
loans but not for credit card loans. The cyclical excess default rate has a
correlation with cyclical output of -0.493 1.
An alternate way to proxy the excess default rate is to use the difference in
marginal default rates of speculative grade bonds and investment grade bonds.
When the excess default is measured this way, the correlation between cyclical
output and cyclical excess default is -0.254. The corporate bond default rates
are available at annual frequency using Moody’s default data from 1952 to
2010.
The firm solves
max
kt+1,bt+1
E0
∞∑
t=0
Λ0,tΠft
where Λ0,t is the stochastic discount factor for time t, and Πft is the firm’s
profit,
Πft = pt
ˆ ∞
ω˜mt
(ωtAtkαt + (1− δ) kt − bt) ∂F (ω)
+ (1− pt)
ˆ ∞
ω˜nt
(ωtξAtkαt + (1− δ) kt − bt) ∂F (ω)
The firms is monitored with probability pt and in that case the default
threshold is ω˜mt , otherwise (1− ξ) of the output is diverted and the default
threshold is ω˜nt . Letting Ωmu,t and Ωnu,t be the partial expectations of the id-
iosyncratic shock, Ωmu,t =
´∞
ω˜mt
ω∂F (ω) and Ωnu,t =
´∞
ω˜nt
ω∂F (ω), we re-write
1The unfiltered excess default rate is also negatively correlated with output (correlation -
0.304). However, credit card delinquency rates peaked after the recession in 2009Q2 and have
dropped significantly since then. As a result, the excess default rate was fairly stationary
up to 2009Q2 but has since trended markedly lower.
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firm’s profit as
Πft = pt
{
Ωmu,tAtkαt + (1− F (ω˜mt )) [(1− δ) kt − bt]
}
+ (1− pt)
{
Ωnu,tξAtkαt + (1− F (ω˜mt )) [(1− δ) kt − bt]
}
The firm’s first order condition is
pt+1Et

αΩmu,t+1At+1kα−1t+1 +
(
1− F (ω˜mt+1)) [(1− δ)− zt]
+
(
Ωmu,t+1
)′
At+1kαt+1
∂ω˜mt+1
∂kt+1
−f (ω˜mt+1) ∂ω˜mt+1∂kt+1 ((1− δ) kt+1 − ztkt+1)

+ (1− pt+1)Et

αΩnu,t+1ξAt+1kα−1t+1 +
(
1− F (ω˜nt+1)) [(1− δ)− zt]
+
(
Ωnu,t+1
)′
ξAt+1kαt+1
∂ω˜nt+1
∂kt+1
−f (ω˜nt+1) ∂ω˜nt+1∂kt+1 ((1− δ) kt+1 − ztkt+1)

= 0
(2.5)
where (
Ωmu,t+1
)′ ≡ ∂Ωmu,t+1
∂ω˜mt+1
(
Ωnu,t+1
)′ ≡ ∂Ωnu,t+1/∂ω˜nt+1
This first-order condition says that the firm considers two dimensions when
deciding the amount of capital to hold next period, kt+1. The first dimension is
the direct effect of additional capital. Additional capital leads to greater output
while the firm receives an idiosyncratic shock above the default threshold.
This is the modified marginal product of capital. Provided the firm does not
default, it also sells undepreciated capital and pays back the bank loan. Firms
also consider the second dimension of additional capital that more capital, and
hence more borrowing, increases the firm’s expected default rate. These are
the terms that have ∂ω˜mt+1/∂kt+1 or ∂ω˜nt+1/∂kt+1. An increase in the default
rate means the firm keeps its production less of the time. In addition, the firm
pays back loans less often.
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Banks pool deposits from households and lend to firms. Each banker is
fully diversified across both households and firms. The savings market clearing
condition is
bt+1
zt
= dt+1
rt
(2.6)
Banks solve
max
pt+1,dt+1,bt+1
E0
∞∑
t=0
Λ0,tΠbt
where Πbt is the bank’s profit. For all firms that do not default, the bank
receives the loan repayment amount bt. For firms that default, the bank takes
over all the firm’s production and capital and incurs a default cost (or a state
verification cost) equal to a proportion 1 − θ of the collateral received. Each
period, bankers return depositor funds with interest. Bankers also incur a fixed
cost µ for each firm that they monitor.
Πbt = pt
{ˆ ∞
ω˜mt
bt∂F (ω) +
ˆ ω˜mt
−∞
θ (ωtAtkαt + (1− δ) k) ∂F (ω)
}
+ (1− pt)
{ˆ ∞
ω˜nt
bt∂F (ω) +
ˆ ω˜nt
−∞
θ (ωtξAtkαt + (1− δ) k) ∂F (ω)
}
− dt − µpt
Letting Ωml,t =
´ ω˜mt
−∞ ωt∂F (ω) and Ω
n
l,t =
´ ω˜nt
−∞ ωt∂F (ω),
Πbt = pt
{
(1− F (ω˜mt ) bt) + θ
(
Ωml,tAtkαt + F (ω˜mt ) (1− δ) kt
)}
+ (1− pt)
{
(1− F (ω˜nt ) bt) + θ
(
Ωnl,tξAtkαt + F (ω˜nt ) (1− δ) kt
)}
− dt − µpt
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The bank’s first order condition for lending is
pt+1Et

(
1− F (ω˜mt+1))+ θzt (αΩml,t+1At+1kα−1t+1 + F (ω˜mt+1) (1− δ))
−f (ω˜mt+1) bt+1 ∂ω˜mt+1∂kt+1 1zt
+ θzt
∂ω˜mt+1
∂kt+1
{(
Ωml,t+1
)′
At+1kαt+1 + f
(
ω˜mt+1
)
(1− δ) kt+1
}

= rtzt
(1− pt+1)Et

(
1− F (ω˜nt+1))
+ θzt
(
αΩnl,t+1ξAt+1k
α−1
t+1 + F
(
ω˜nt+1
)
(1− δ)
)
−f (ω˜nt+1) bt+1 ∂ω˜nt+1∂kt+1 1zt
+ θzt
∂ω˜nt+1
∂kt+1
{(
Ωnl,t+1
)′
ξAt+1kαt+1 + f
(
ω˜nt+1
)
(1− δ) kt+1
}

(2.7)
The direct effect of increasing lending bt+1 for banks is that banks receive
repayment on non-defaulted loans. This corresponds to the
(
1− F
(
ω˜mt+1
))
term. Through the savings market, they need to pay rt for the additional
funds. The lending spread zt − rt covers default costs. Banks realize that
lending more to firms increases the loan’s default chance, and so banks also
take into account the secondary effect of lending,
(
∂ω˜mt+1/∂kt+1
)
·(∂kt+1/∂bt+1).
A higher default chance means higher default costs, so this adds to the marginal
cost of lending. This effect is slightly moderated because higher lending also
means higher collateral and slightly greater recovery given default.
The bank’s first order condition for monitoring is
µ = bt+1Et
[
F
(
ω˜nt+1
)
− F
(
ω˜mt+1
)]
−θEt

[
F
(
ω˜nt+1
)
− F
(
ω˜mt+1
)]
(1− δ) kt+1
+Ωnl,t+1ξAt+1kαt+1 − Ωml,t+1At+1kαt+1

(2.8)
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The condition’s interpretation is clear when θ = 0, so that all production
and capital is wiped out following default. In that case monitoring a loan can
reduce the probability of default from F
(
ω˜nt+1
)
to F
(
ω˜mt+1
)
. With θ > 0, the
effect is slightly moderated as the recovery given default is potentially higher
when the default probability is higher (provided ξ is not too low). From the
bank’s perspective, the reduction in default rate applies to the loan repayment,
bt+1. As discussed further in section 5, this marginal benefit is too low from
the planner’s perspective.
2.2.3 Equilibrium
The goods market clearing condition is
Yt = Ct + It (2.9)
where It is aggregate investment. Yt is aggregate output,
Yt = AtKαt
(
pt
[
Ωmu,t + θΩml,t
]
+ (1− pt)
[
Ωnu,t + θΩnl,t
]
ξ
)
− µpt (2.10)
The economy loses a fraction (1− θ) of output produced by each firm that de-
faults. The model also assumes that diverted output is lost from the economy;
model features are largely unaffected even if diverted output is not lost from
the economy. Since firms start the period with the same amount of capital,
capital aggregation is standard. Capital evolution is
Kt+1 = pt (1− δ) [1− F (ω˜mt ) + θF (ω˜mt )]
+ (1− pt) (1− δ) [1− F (ω˜nt ) + θF (ω˜nt )] + It
(2.11)
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Log total factor productivity follows an AR(1) process,
ln (At) = ρln (At−1) + A,t (2.12)
where A,t is a stationary TFP shock and ρ is the TFP shock persistence.
Equilibrium for the aggregate economy is a list {Ct, Kt, Yt , pt, It, Bt, Dt,
ω˜mt , ω˜
n
t zt, rt, At}∞t=0 such that equations (1) - (12) are satisfied, given A0, K0,
B0, D0, p0, and the set of exogenous stochastic disturbances {t}∞t=0.
2.3 Countercyclical Bank Monitoring
2.3.1 Calibration
The functional form for utility is ln (ct) . The model has four standard param-
eters, the intertemporal discount factor β, the production parameter α, the
capital depreciation rate δ, and the TFP shock persistence ρ. I calibrate these
within standard ranges; β = 0.991, α = 0.3, δ = 0.025, and ρ = 0.95. There
are five other parameters in the model to calibrate - the idiosyncratic shock
distribution parameters ω¯ and σω, the costly state verification parameter θ,
the monitoring cost per firm µ, and the firm moral hazard parameter ξ. E (ω)
is set to 1, so that
eω¯+
1
2σ
2
ω = 1
The remaining four parameters are calibrated simultaneously to meet the
following steady-state targets:
1. Since the model features single period loans, the default rate is equal to
the delinquency rate. The target annualized default rate on monitored
loans is the average delinquency rate on consumer loans since 1987, 3.4%.
2. The target annualized default rate on non-monitored loans is the average
delinquency rate on credit card loans since 1991, 4.3%.
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3. The credit spread target is 0.84%, the long-run average spread between
BAA rated bonds and 3-month treasuries.
4. Steady state p = 0.64 to match the average fraction of corporate bonds
issued annually that are investment grade. Table 1 summarizes the cali-
bration.
2.3.2 Baseline results
Figure 4 shows the impulse response to a 1% aggregate productivity shock.
The correlation of bank monitoring with output in the model is -0.55. This
compares with a correlation of -0.17 for SLOOS lending terms and output. The
correlation of excess default with default in the model is also -0.55 compared
to -0.49 for the excess default data proxy. Table 2 shows four model and data
correlations- the monitoring rate, monitored and non-monitored default rates,
and the excess default rate. The model setup means that all four variables co-
move with output. The default thresholds ω˜m and ω˜n are linearly dependent,
giving rise to the co-movement between excess default rates and default rates.
The excess default rate drives the bank’s monitoring decision, p, giving rise
to co movement between excess default and monitoring. The model moments
are close to data proxy moments. Table 3 reports the moments using annual
corporate bond default rates as default rate proxies.
2.4 Effect of Monitoring on the Business Cycle
In this section I compare business cycle features of the baseline model with a
version of the model where bank monitoring activity is fixed. In the comparison
model, I set bank monitoring to be constant at it’s steady state, pt = 0.64 ∀t.
This comparison shows how dynamic monitoring incentives influence the busi-
ness cycle. Table 4 shows the results of this comparison. The table reports
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the coefficient of variation for several variables as well as the volatility of these
variables with respect to output in the model. The column with the header
‘amplification percentage’ reports the percentage increase in volatility due to
dynamic monitoring. Negative percentages in this column indicate that dy-
namic monitoring damps the variable. By construction both models have the
same steady state. Figure 5 shows the impulse responses from the two models.
Dynamic monitoring amplifies consumption volatility. The magnitude of
this amplification is large - the coefficient of variation for consumption is about
16% higher when banks choose their desired level of monitoring. An interesting
implication of this result is that acyclical monitoring is better for welfare. With
dynamic monitoring, banks monitor less during booms resulting in greater di-
version of output. Firm owners now require higher return on capital to com-
pensate for higher diversion and invest less. This damps investment during
booms. Diverted output can still be consumed, however, and this boosts con-
sumption volatility in the model. Acyclical bank monitoring prevents excess
consumption volatility, and is hence better for welfare.
2.5 Monitoring Inefficiency
The holdup problem in the model is clear in a variation of the baseline model
with fixed exogenous default rates. In this variation, bank monitoring directly
reduces the default rate from γn for a non-monitored firm to γm for a monitored
firm, with γn > γm. Similar to the baseline model, the bank and firm only
know the aggregate proportion of monitoring activity at the start of the period.
During the period, banks randomly pick firms to monitor - the number of firms
monitored is consistent with the aggregate proportion choice. In the event of
a default, firms hand over their output and capital to the bank. Now the firm
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solves
max
kt+1,bt+1
E0
∞∑
t=0
Λ0,tΠft
where
Πft = [Atkαt + (1− δ) kt − bt] {pt (1− γm) + (1− pt) (1− γn)}
kt+1 =
bt+1
zt
The bank receives loan repayment when the firm does not default. A mon-
itored firm defaults with probability γm and a non-monitored firm defaults
with probability γn. The bank repays depositors and incurs a monitoring cost
per firm. The bank solves
max
bt+1,dt+1,pt+1
E0
∞∑
t=0
Λ0,tΠbt
where
Πbt = pt {(1− γm) bt + γmθ (Atkαt + (1− δ) kt)} − dt
(1− pt) {(1− γn) bt + γnθ (Atkαt + (1− δ) kt)} − µpt
bt+1
zt
= dt+1
rt
The households’ problem remains unchanged,
max
ct,dt+1
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU (ct)
subject to
ct +
dt+1
rt
≤ dt + Πft + Πbt
We can compare the decentralized economy with the planner’s problem.
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The planner solves
max
Ct,Kt+1,It,Yt,pt+1
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU (Ct)
subject to the aggregate constraints
Yt = AtKαt {pt (1− γm + θγm) + (1− pt) (1− γn + θγn)} − µpt
Yt = Ct + It
Kt+1 = Kt (1− δ) {pt (1− γm + θγm) + (1− pt) (1− γn + θγn)}+ It
It can be shown that the first order conditions for the decentralized problem
and the planner’s problem are equivalent except the first order condition for
monitoring activity, pt. The planner’s first order condition for monitoring is
µ = Et

(
At+1K
α
t+1 + (1− δ)Kt+1
)
(γn − γm)
+θ
(
At+1K
α
t+1 + (1− δ)Kt+1
)
(γm − γn)

(2.13)
whereas the bank’s first order condition for monitoring is
µ = Et

(
αAt+1K
α
t+1 + (1− δ)Kt+1
)
(γn − γm)
+θ
(
At+1K
α
t+1 + (1− δ)Kt+1
)
(γm − γn)

(2.14)
The marginal cost of monitoring for both the planner and the bank is µ.
However, the marginal benefit of preventing default for the planner is the
entire output At+1Kαt+1 whereas for the bank it is only αAt+1Kαt+1. The planner
therefore chooses a higher level of monitoring than the bank. One implication
of this finding is that banks would make less monitoring effort for firms that
rely more on internal finance. These firms would be able to hold up more of
the return from lending.
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Figure 6 shows that for any given level of steady state monitoring, p, the
planner is willing to incur a higher monitoring cost compared to a bank making
a decentralized decision. Figure 6 is drawn after calibrating the model as in
section 3.1 with γn and γm calibrated to give the target annualized default
rates.
2.6 Conclusion
Banks engage in risk-shifting over the business cycle by saving on monitoring
costs during business cycle improvements. Idiosyncratic shocks in the model
are normally distributed, so that the chance of receiving sufficiently adverse
shocks drops faster for risky firms that earlier needed only ’moderately’ adverse
shocks to default. An interpretation of this is that prudent firms are less
affected by business cycle fluctuations since they are unlikely to default even
in cyclical downturns. The marginal benefit of monitoring loans hence reduces
following an aggregate improvement.
In addition, banks choose inefficiently low level of monitoring as firms hold
up part of the returns from lending activity. One implication of this is that
banks are less likely to monitor firms that rely less heavily on external finance.
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Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: Model calibration
Parameter Description Value
β intertemporal discount 0.991
α production 0.300
δ depreciation 0.025
ρ TFP persistence 0.950
ω¯ mean of ln (ω) -0.11
σω standard deviation of ln (ω) 0.469
θ costly state verification 0.674
µ monitoring cost 0.012
ξ firm moral hazard 0.960
Table 2.2: Model and data correlations
Variable Correlation Data proxy
model data
p
-0.55 -0.17
SLOOS, net percent banks
monitoring rate tightening terms: loan covenants
F (ω˜m)
-0.55 -0.53
Delinquency rate
monitored default rate on consumer loans
F (ω˜n)
-0.55 -0.61
Delinquency rate
non-monitored default rate on credit card loans
F (ω˜n)− F (ω˜m)
-0.55 -0.49
Credit card - consumer loan
excess default rate delinquency rates
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Table 2.3: Model and Data Correlation Using Annual Corporate Bonds Data
Variable Correlation Data proxy
model data
F (ω˜m)
-0.55 -0.16
Investment grade (a)
monitored default rate bond default rate
F (ω˜n)
-0.55 -0.22
Speculative grade (b)
non-monitored default rate bond default rate
F (ω˜n)− F (ω˜m)
-0.55 -0.25
b− a
excess default rate
Table 2.4: Effect of dynamic monitoring on the business cycle
coefficient of variation volatility relative to Y
D E F D E F
C 0.0066 0.0058 15.8% 0.50 0.43 16.3%
p 0.0314 0.0000 N/A 2.36 0.00 N/A
Y 0.0133 0.0132 1.0% 1.00 1.00 0.0%
I 0.0433 0.0436 -7.7% 3.26 3.55 -8.2%
B 0.0043 0.0046 -6.5% 0.32 0.36 -11.1%
Table 2.5: D: dynamic monitoring; E: static monitoring; F: amplification per-
centage
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Figure 2.1: Time series of speculative grade marginal default rates
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Figure 2.2: Federal Reserve SLOOS - net percent of banks tightening loan
covenant terms to firms
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Figure 2.3: A Drop in the Excess Default Rate
The top panel shows the pdf of omega with the default thresholds. The bottom
panel shows a zoom of the pdf around the default thresholds and shows the effect
of a left shift in the thresholds. A leftward shift of both thresholds results in a drop
in the excess default rate. The excess default rate drops by the difference in area
between the taller and shorter trapezia. otm: ω˜m otn: ω˜n. Delinquency rate data
from Federal Reserve Economic Data.
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Figure 2.4: Baseline model response to 1% TFP shock
mpod: F (ω˜m); npod: F (ω˜n); wapod: ptF (ω˜m) + (1− pt)F (ω˜n); exd:
F (ω˜n)− F (ω˜m); spr: zt − rt
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Figure 2.5: Dynamic and static monitoring impulse responses
mpod: F (ω˜m); npod: F (ω˜n); wapod: ptF (ω˜m) + (1− pt)F (ω˜n); exd:
F (ω˜n)− F (ω˜m); spr: zt − rt
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Figure 2.6: Monitoring Cost
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Chapter 3
Optimal Fiscal Policy and
Public Goods
with Huynh Bao Tan
Chapter Abstract
This paper proposes a DSGE framework with heterogeneous households and
government’s provision of public goods to analyze the properties of optimal fis-
cal policy over the business cycles. Our focus is on the quantitative properties
of income tax rates optimized by the Ramsey planner for optimal public goods
provision. We found that the presence of public goods provision modifies the
properties of the optimal taxes compared to earlier results in the literature.
The results also show significant heterogeneity in the dynamics of tax rates
among households of different income levels. The implication is that the Ram-
sey planner is highly active in managing tax changes in response to business
cycles variations, and that the optimal taxes for the low-income household can
differ markedly from that for mid-income and high-income households.
67
3.1 Introduction
Over the course of the US 2012 Presidential election, a key flashpoint between
the candidates was whether aﬄuent households should bear a higher tax bur-
den to finance government spending. The question of optimal taxation and
public goods provision has long been given much attention in the literature on
public economics. We have had microeconomic foundations established in these
areas by the works of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971a, 1971b, 1971c), Atkinson
and Stern (1974), and Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976). There have also been
works that sought to answer these two questions together, such as Boadway
and Keen (1993). Of macroeconomic analysis, Barro (1990) and Judd (1999)
provided qualitative insights on the effects of taxes and government spending
in growth, while further towards the quantitative side of the literature, recent
works on optimal taxation include Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993) and Chari,
Christiano and Kehoe (1994), as well as Benigno and Woodford (2004). Pro-
viding a more quantitative analysis than either Barro (1991) or Judd (1999),
Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993) also studied the implications of optimal tax-
ation on economic growth. Benigno and Woodford (2004) addressed rather
the methodological aspect of solving a Ramsey optimal taxation model using
a linear-quadratic approach. Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1994) investigated
the cyclical properties of Ramsey optimal taxes over the business cycles in an
RBC framework with aggregate shocks. Their results presented a near con-
stancy of labor income tax and zero ex-ante capital tax to be Ramsey optimal,
and also showed that it is welfare-improving when the U.S. switched from its
actual tax scheme to the optimal taxation scheme.
Overall, while the question of public good provision has been addressed, it
has been mostly confined to qualitative analysis. In an RBC or DSGE frame-
work, to study the quantitative implications of optimal taxes over the business
cycles A˜ la Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1994), the added concern of public
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goods consumption/provision has not been incorporated. Furthermore, while
the microeconomic and qualitative literature has provided substantial results
on optimal taxes with heterogeneous agents, there is almost no corresponding
quantitative analysis done to complement those results.
In this paper we aim to fill this gap in the quantitative literature by in-
vestigating the dynamics of Ramsey optimal taxation in the context of public
goods consumption/provision in an RBC framework. We adopted the same
methodological approach as in Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1994), that is,
we studied the business cycles properties of the Ramsey optimal taxes in a
model economy subjected to aggregate shocks. Two main features set our
model and scope of analysis apart from previous quantitative efforts. The in-
troduction of a government that takes charge of public goods provision allows
us to determine, from the point of view of the Ramsey planner, if and how
the optimal taxation dynamics deviate from previous results. With multiple
households endowed with different income-earning abilities and paying corre-
spondingly different income tax rates, we hope to shed light on whether there
is a distinction in the dynamic properties of labor taxes paid by households
with different levels of income stream, particularly in response to aggregate
shocks over the business cycles. This feature of agent heterogeneity has found
a prominent place in the microeconomic and qualitative analysis, pointing to
its relevance in the public finance literature. The need therefore is incorporate
this feature into a quantitative framework to unearth (if any) differential tax
dynamics among the households with different earning abilities.
Our framework comprises three separate representative households opti-
mizing over their private consumption and leisure choices. In addition they
all derive utility from a given level of public goods, for the consumption of
which they pay taxes to the fiscal authority. The households are distinguished
by their different income levels, for which they pay different income tax rates.
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The authority - the Ramsey planner in this case, set tax rates and issue debt,
to optimally finance the provision of public goods. Two kinds of production
happen in the model. One is the usual private sector production that is used
for private consumption and investment and government spending, and the
other is a public sector production to produce and maintain the stock of pub-
lic goods. The fiscal authority in our framework therefore is formalized by the
following features: distortionary taxes on income, government debt and public
goods production. It is also characterized by a passive fiscal rule to stabilize
its debt.
We solved for the Ramsey optimal equilibrium, namely an equilibrium
where the Ramsey planner chooses the policy instruments (the income tax
rates in our model) to maximize the social welfare, subjected to the competi-
tive equilibrium conditions produced by the model. We ran the model under
two main aggregate shocks: a productivity/technological (TFP) shock and
a government spending shock (that only affects the exogenous consumption
component of total government spending).
Our results indicate that the Ramsey optimal tax policy is highly active
in response to business cycles fluctuations. To optimize social welfare and the
provision of public goods the Ramsey planner adopts a tax-smoothing regime
in response to the two shocks, varying the households’ tax rates to cope with
changes to the government budget constraint. Among the three households,
however, there exists considerable heterogeneity in the dynamics of their tax
rates.
Concretely, the optimal income taxes display higher volatilities than the
results of CCK (1994) suggested. The volatilities also differ markedly across
the households, with lower-income households’ taxes displaying progressively
higher volatility. The heterogeneity of optimal taxes among the households
also shows up in terms of their correlation with output and with the underlying
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shocks. Overall the results suggest a more active intervention by the Ramsey
planner in response to business cycles fluctuations using the income taxes as
optimization instruments. Also, by and large, she follows a tax-smoothing
regime, that is, tax rates are changed in response to impacts on the government
budget constraint. In the case of technological shock, however, the low-income
household is subjected to a more Keynesian-style tax regime, the implication
of which is that the lowest-income household is shielded to a certain extent
from the impact of the shock, while most of the tax-smoothing fiscal policy
is born by the middle- and high-income households. The case of government
spending shock differs from productivity shock in that there is no different tax
treatment for the low-income household in terms of the tax rate’s cyclicality
with output or the underlying shock. Nonetheless under government spending
shock the low-income household still has the smallest responses in terms of
consumption and welfare, demonstrating that the Ramsey planner’s objective
of optimizing social welfare aligns with minimizing the effects of shocks on
the household. In addition, the low-income household’s labor dynamics stands
out from those of the two upper-income households under both shocks. The
low-income household’s labor displays a higher positive correlation with its
private consumption, indicating a larger contribution of labor (dis)utility in
dampening the household’s welfare responses. Under this Ramsey optimal
taxation regime for the baseline calibration, the goal is to keep a stable stock
of public goods, hence under both shocks government investment spending is
highly volatile but essentially acyclical.
We also ran a number of sensitivity analyses to check the robustness of
the optimal tax results. In one, we affirmed the crucial role of public good
consumption and provision in the optimal tax results found in the baseline
calibration. As the weight of public goods consumption in the households’
utility function goes near zero, the volatilities of tax rates decrease apprecia-
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bly, moving their dynamics nearer to those found in CCK (1994). The cycli-
cality of the tax rates also changes dramatically. When the Ramsey planner’s
objective becomes optimizing social welfare based only on private consump-
tions on labors, there is less need for her to vary the households’ tax rates
significantly with shocks. As a result the stock of public goods also becomes
highly variable and virtually in perfect positive correlation with output, as it
no longer features in the social welfare function. Another exercise investigating
the sensitivity of the tax results on the households’ labor productivities found
that the low-income labor productivity has a negative relationship with its tax
rate’s volatility, while for the two upper-income households the relationship
is positive. This again illustrates the Ramsey planner’s optimal strategy of
using tax policy to limit the impact of shocks on the low-income household
and dampen the responses of its consumption and welfare. Lastly, we reran
the optimal tax analysis under different specifications of the utility function.
We found that different specifications of the utility function also have a role
in varying to a certain extent the quantitative dynamics of the optimal taxa-
tion results. A separable consumption-leisure specification causes productivity
shock to have a more pronounced impact on social welfare, necessitating more
shielding to the low-income household but at the same time less burden on
the mid- and high-income households. The contribution of labor (dis)utility
to a household’s welfare becomes less important, causing the Ramsey planner
to focus less on using labor dynamics for welfare optimization purpose and
thus to arrive at a slightly different set of optimal tax results. A non-separable
private-public consumption results in a tax policy that is less responsive to
the business cycles, as the level of public goods helps reduce the marginal util-
ities of consumption. This also leads to pro-cyclical government investment
spending and a more volatile stock of public goods. Qualitatively, however,
the central optimal tax results remain, that is, the Ramsey planner actively
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manages income taxes to best respond to aggregate shocks, and there are sig-
nificant heterogeneity among the households in terms of the properties of their
income taxes.
3.2 Model
3.2.1 Households
Our model assumes the existence of three types of household, with each type
j representing the average (representative) household from an income group j.
Each household is represented by a labor productivity j, the rate of income
tax tauj it is subject to, and its mass ξj such that ∑ξj = 1. In our model, for
purpose of better matching with tax data we do not propose separate taxes on
labor income and on returns on capital. Each household’s wage and return on
capital are grouped together as taxable income and are subject to the same
tax rate τ j.
Each household maximizes its expected lifetime utility
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU
(
Cjt , H
j
t , Lt
)
subject to its budget constraint
(1 + τc)Cjt +Bjt+1 + qt
(
Kjt+1 − (1− δ)Kjt
)
=
(
wt
jHjt + rktK
j
t
) (
1− τ jt
)
+φk
(
Kjt + K¯j
)−2
+ φb
(
Bjt + B¯j
)−2
+
(
1 + rbt
)
Bjt
(3.1)
where Cj, Bj, Kj, and Hj are each household’s consumption, bond holdings,
capital stock and labor supply respectively. Lt is the stock of public goods. We
consider the stock of public capital giving utility to the households. Each pe-
riod the household’s spending includes consumption and investments in capital
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and bonds, while its earnings come from wage, returns on capital and bonds.
It pays an income tax of τ j on its earnings from capital rental and labor, as
well as a consumption tax τc. Earnings from bonds are tax-exempt. rk and rb
are returns on capital and bonds, and qt the price of capital, respectively.
A dynamic model with several types of household poses an indeterminacy
problem1, in that each household’s levels of capital and bonds cannot be de-
termined. To overcome this technical issue, borrowing constraints have to
be introduced for each household. The borrowing constraints for capital and
bonds that each household faces are assumed to take the following form
Kjt > K¯j B
j
t > B¯j
We model the borrowing constraints for capital and bonds that each house-
hold faces as penalty functions φk
(
Kjt + K¯j
)−2
and φb
(
Bjt + B¯j
)−2
following
Monacelli (2009). This provides the mechanism that punishes the households
in terms of costs if their capital and bond holdings come too close to the bor-
rowing limits. These constraints are introduced mainly for technical reasons.
The limits are calibrated so that the households’ capital and bond holdings
produce income streams matching those in the data. Given the size of the
aggregate shocks, the households’ steady holdings of stock and bond are too
far away from the limits for these constraints to be binding.
The resulting first order conditions are thus
1 = EtΛjt,t+1
(
1 + rbt+1 + φb
(
Bjt+1 + B¯j
)−3)
(3.2)
qt = EtΛjt,t+1
(
(1− δ) qt+1 + rkt+1
(
1− τ jt+1
)
+ φk
(
Kjt+1 + K¯j
)−3)
(3.3)
1Monacelli (2009) discusses this issue
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where Λj is the stochastic discount factor,
Λjt,t+1 = β
U ′
Cjt+1
U ′
Cjt
The intra-temporal labour supply condition is
−U ′
Hjt
= wtiHjtU ′Cjt
1− τ j
1 + τc
(3.4)
Each household’s capital stock evolves according to the following equation
Kjt+1 = (1− δ)Kjt + Ijt (3.5)
3.2.2 Private Production
Firms maximize profits,
maxE0
{
Yt − rktKpt − wtHpt
}
given the following Cobb-Douglas production function
Yt = At (Kpt )α (Hpt )1−α (3.6)
A is the level of technology with the stochastic shock νa. The firms’ first order
conditions are
rkt = αAt (K
p
t )α−1 (Hpt )1−α (3.7)
wt = (1− α)At (Kpt )α (Hpt )−α (3.8)
3.2.3 Government
We formalize the role of government in this model by having it provide public
goods to the households. The expenditure of this nature is called government
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investment spending, Ig. It goes towards the maintenance of public goods,
whose stock Lt evolves according to the following equation
Lt+1 = (1− δg)Lt + Igt (3.9)
where public good production Ig takes the following form
Igt = At (Kgt )α (Hgt )(1−α) (3.10)
We can interpret this to mean that the government possesses a production
technology identical to that of the private sector and acquires the factors of
production directly from the competitive market, or that it contracts out this
public good production to the private sector.
Every period the government has to satisfy its own budget constraint,
Tt +Bt+1 = wtHgt + rktK
g
t + gtYt +
(
1 + rbt
)
Bt (3.11)
tax receipts and proceeds from sale of its bonds to the households must equal its
spending and bond interest payments. gtYt is government consumption where
gt is the proportion of output that the government consumes. gt is assumed to
be exogenous and follows an AR(1) process. The aggregate revenue is given
by
Tt =
∑
i
ξi
{
τctC
i
t + τ it
(
rktK
i
t + wtiH it
)}
(3.12)
while Bt is the aggregate government debt and is given by
Bt =
∑
i
ξiBit (3.13)
In order to maintain a stable evolution path for its debt, the government also
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makes use of the following simple fiscal rule,
ln (Bt) = ζT ln (Tt) + ζg
(
wtH
g
t + rktK
g
t + gtYt
)
(3.14)
We assume that the government minimizes the cost of public good production.
Assuming competitive markets for factors of production, i.e. the government
pays the same wage and return on capital as does the private sector, this leads
to the following first order condition
Kgt
Hgt
= K
p
t
Hpt
(3.15)
3.2.4 Capital Goods Producers
The model assumes adjustment costs in capital investments. The capital goods
producer therefore solves the following maximization problem
max
It
E0
∞∑
t=0
{
qt (Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt)− ItF
(
It
It−1
)}
where F is the adjustment cost function,
F
(
It
It−1
)
= 1 + ϕI2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
The first order condition is
qt = 1 +
ϕI
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
+ It
It−1
(
It
It−1
− 1
)
− Λt,t+1ϕI
(
It+1
It
)2 (It+1
It
− 1
)
(3.16)
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3.2.5 Equilibrium and Aggregation
In equilibrium, aggregate capital, labor, consumption, and investments are
given by
∑
j
ξjKjt = Kg +Kp (3.17)∑
j
ξjHjt = Hg +Hp (3.18)
It =
∑
j
ξjIjt (3.19)
Ct =
∑
j
ξjCjt (3.20)
Market clearing requires that
Yt = Ct + ItF
It
It−1
+ gtYt + Igt (3.21)
3.2.6 Exogenous Shocks
The model is run subject to two shocks: a TFP shock and a government
spending shock. Both take the form of an AR(1) functions
ln (At) = ρa (At−1) + νa (3.22)
gt − g¯ = ρg (gt−1 − g¯) + νg (3.23)
where g¯ is the parameter representing steady state government consumption
share of output.
Equations (1) - (20), and the shock processes (22) and (23) together form
the equilibrium conditions of the model.
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3.3 Data, Calibration, and Solution Method
3.3.1 Data
For the purpose of calibrating our model to the U.S. economy, we obtained
the U.S. macro data from NIPA, and tax return data from the IRS. The data
relevant for the calibration of the model are the tax returns, GDP, personal
consumption and government spending and investment data. We use the ‘Re-
turns With Modified Taxable Income’ IRS publication for tax return data.
3.3.2 Calibration
Household utility
The baseline utility function takes the following form
(Cj (1−Hj)γ)1−σ − 1
1− σ (Ch∗(1−Hh)
gamma)(1−sigma)−1)+ψlog (Lt) (3.24)
This utility function is identical across household types. The quarterly discount
factor is set at 0.99. The risk aversion parameter, σ, is set at 1, meaning
that the utility takes the widely used form of a log function, while the labor
elasticity, γ, is set at 2.
Household abilities, household masses and steady-state income taxes
The tax return data from NIPA form the basis for our calibration. We used
data on taxable income, since they aggregate all sources of income that are
liable to tax payments by the households and align well with our model setup.
The data gave us access to the amount of tax paid at different levels of income.
From this we divided the data into three income groups to match our model:
low-income, middle-income and high-income, according to the following income
cut-offs: the first 40% of households form the low-income segment, the next
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30% form the middle-income segment, and the remaining 30% are the high-
income households.
Given the difficulty of getting data on households’ capital and bond hold-
ings according to the three income classes that we have defined, we calibrated
the model using the mean income calculated for each group. The ratios be-
tween the different income classes’ mean incomes allowed us to calibrate the
capital, bonds and labor productivity, j, of each household so that in our
model they produce income streams in similar ratios.
Private and public goods production
With Cobb-Douglas production function assumed for both private and public
productions, the capital-share parameter is also set identically at 0.36 for both
sectors. They also share the same TFP process, so that both sectors are subject
at the same time to productivity shocks.
Government investment and consumption spending
We use the government spending data obtained from NIPA for the calibration
of government consumption and investment spending in our model. We cali-
brate steady state g, g¯, to be 16% of output, which is the average government
consumption share of output from NIPA.
Fiscal rule
The simple fiscal rule is calibrated to ensure stability of the dynamic system in
terms of the evolution of government debt. In addition, the parameters of the
fiscal rule are chosen so as to produce a 4% risk-free return rate on government
bonds and positive values for the household’s bond holdings.
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Standard errors of exogenous shocks
For shocks to the productivity process, we employ the standard value of 0.007
for the standard error mostly in use in the literature for the U.S. economy. For
shocks to government consumption spending, the standard error is calibrated
to be 5% of the steady state value of government consumption spending, which
works out to be 0.9% of total output.
Appendix Table 1 has the full list of calibrated parameters.
3.3.3 Solution Method
We use Dynare 4.2 to approximate the equilibrium conditions of the model
around the model steady state. The computational method used by Dynare is
based on the perturbation method. The solution and simulation of the Ramsey
optimal equilibrium are also done in Dynare.
3.4 Properties of Ramsey - Optimal Income
Taxes
We present in this section the results of the baseline calibration. Table 1 reports
the dynamics of the optimal income tax rates and government investment
spending in three cases: under productivity shock only, under government
spending shock only and under both shocks. The model is simulated for 4000
periods, and this simulation is repeated 200 times, each time producing one
set of simulated data. We then averaged over these 200 sets of data to obtain
the needed statistics. Table 1 shows the properties of this simulation.
The first observation is that the Ramsey optimal tax policy is highly re-
sponsive to the business cycle. The effective income tax varies to a good extent
with productivity shocks, and quite significantly so with changes in government
spending. It also displays positive correlation with both shocks, and highly so
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Table 3.1: Properties of cyclical Ramsey-optimal income taxes
Prod shock only g shock only Both shocks
High income tax
%StdDev 2.96 16.60 16.87
Corr with output -0.2123 -0.5575 -0.2414
Corr with shock(s) -0.0505 0.9772 -0.0074; 0.962
Auto-correlation 0.0992 0.9644 0.9377
Mid income tax
%StdDev 5.01 27.62 28.13
Corr with output -0.5220 -0.5800 -0.3017
Corr with shock(s) -0.3500 0.9812 -0.0614; 0.9652
Autocorrelation 0.4215 0.9706 0.9531
Low income tax
%StdDev 11.27 33.08 35.01
Corr with output 0.5015 -0.4627 -0.0151
Corr with shock(s) 0.5223 0.9368 0.1718; 0.8865
Autocorrelation 0.1616 0.9226 0.8431
Effective income tax
%StdDev 5.11 24.52 25.09
Corr with output 0.0886 -0.5338 -0.1803
Corr with shock(s) 0.1935 0.9693 0.0415; 0.9489
Autocorrelation -0.0320 0.9573 0.9161
Gov inv spending
%StdDev 11.55 15.65 19.44
Corr with output 0.0349 -0.0012 0.0185
Corr with shock(s) 0.0553 -0.0192 0.0331; -0.0153
Autocorrelation -0.3085 -0.3121 -0.3111
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in the case of shock to government spending
Moreover, the three households are not prescribed the same optimal policy.
There is appreciable heterogeneity in terms of volatility: the volatility of the
optimal tax rate for each household varies according to its income- the lower the
income, the higher the volatility. Also, in response to productivity shock alone,
the Ramsey optimal taxes have another considerable source of heterogeneity
across the households. The correlation between the tax rates and output varies
widely. The two higher-income households have their tax rates negatively
correlated with output (with the tax rate of the middle-income household
highly more so), while the optimal tax for the lowest income household has
a positive correlation with output. The result on the overall effective tax
rate is that it is essentially acyclical (with very small positive correlation with
output and a small positive correlation with underlying shock). The impact
of government spending shock on the other hand is more uniform: all three
tax rates are negatively correlated to output with similar magnitudes, and are
almost perfectly positively correlated with the underlying shock.
The implication of the optimal Ramsey tax results for the case of pro-
ductivity shock is that they are a variation of the tax-smoothing regime of
Barro (1979). The autocorrelations of the three tax rates show no correla-
tion with the persistence of the underlying productivity shock. Essentially,
the Ramsey planner manages tax changes so as to counter the effects of unan-
ticipated shocks to the government’s budget constraint. For instance, when
productivity declines, bringing down tax receipts, the Ramsey planner raises
tax rates in order to make up for the shortfall. However, the striking observa-
tion about the Ramsey optimal tax regime in this case is that the low-income
household is not subjected to it. In fact, the Ramsey planner applies a more
Keynesian-style taxation to the low-income household to buffer it against vari-
ations in productivity. The positive correlation between the low-income tax
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rate and output / productivity means that the tax rate is often raised or low-
ered together with rises and falls in output/productivity. The fact that the
low-income household’s tax rate is highly variable means the Ramsey plan-
ner is highly responsive to smoothing the impact of shocks on the household.
Another important implication from these results is that the middle-income
household (or the collective mid-income group) appears to bear the largest
part of the impact from tax changes in response to productivity shocks. Its
tax rate is significantly more negatively correlated to output, and its volatility
higher, than the high-income household’s tax rate.
From the Ramsey planner’s point of view, these tax dynamics are optimal
for social welfare because, for example in the event of an adverse productiv-
ity shock, they make sure that even though the responding tax hikes might
exacerbate the drops in consumptions from the high-income and mid-income
households, this allows the low-income household to suffer a less drastic drop
in the low-income household’s consumption (hence its own welfare). With the
low-income household’s marginal utility of consumption much higher than the
other two households due to its much lower consumption point on the utility
curve, a reduction in its consumption would translate to a higher reduction in
its welfare than would the same reduction do to the welfares of the two higher-
income households. By sacrificing the appropriate amounts of consumption
from the two higher-income households, to ensure that the low-income house-
hold’s tax burden is reduced and to lessen the contraction in the household’s
consumption, the Ramsey planner ensures that the overall reduction in social
welfare is optimal in response to the shock. The consideration by the Ramsey
planner of public goods provision also plays an important role. As public goods
provision is crucial in maintaining social welfare, and productivity shocks nat-
urally affect the government’s ability to maintain the stock of public goods,
the optimal consideration involves a trade-off between less active fiscal inter-
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vention that would better maintain private consumption and the maintenance
of public goods. In this aspect, the Ramsey planner decides that it is opti-
mal for the two upper income households to shoulder the bulk of public goods
servicing, otherwise the welfare cost on the low-income household in terms of
private consumption loss would be too great.
The Ramsey optimal taxation scheme also achieves its intended purpose
through its effects on labor. The low-income household’s hours worked display
distinct dynamics from those of the two upper-income households in that they
are also more volatile, just like its tax counterpart, and more highly positively
correlated with output (in the case of productivity shock). Thus, as produc-
tivity goes up (down), the low-income household’s hours worked also tend to
go up (down) more, and in larger percentage, than the other two households.
Since the low-income tax rate is also pro-cyclical, as output expands (con-
tracts), the higher (lower) tax rate causes the low-income household to work
more (less), meaning that the income effect dominates. Consequently, this la-
bor dynamics, facilitated by the optimal taxation scheme, helps dampen the
response of the household’s welfare: when for instance productivity shrinks
causing utility from consumption to shrink, utility from leisure increases (or,
disutility from labor decreases), countering the negative effect of the shock.
For this end, the optimal taxes are engineered so as to induce a pre-dominant
substitution effect on the low-income household.
That a large part of the tax burden falls on the middle-income household
may have come as a surprise. However, a look at the model’s dynamics shows
this is due to the fact that the contribution of the middle-income household
to overall tax receipts is the largest, and extracting a higher percentage of its
income (more than the high-income household) to subsidize the low-income
group ensures the lowest fall in social welfare.
Government spending shock brings out different dynamics of optimal taxes,
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even though overall the Ramsey planner still appears to follow a tax-smoothing
regime. The near perfect positive correlation between the tax rates and the
underlying spending shock means that the Ramsey planner raises or lowers
taxes when the government budget is negatively or positively affected. The
tax rates are also highly serially correlated, with their autocorrelations appar-
ently matching the persistence of the underlying shock. Given the spending
shock’s serially correlated nature and direct impact on the government budget
constraint, and the Ramsey planner’s basing the tax changes on the expected
changes in government budget, it is expected thus that the optimal tax rates
follow more manifestly the characteristics of the underlying shock than the case
of productivity shock, whose impact on the government budget constraint is
less immediate. This is evidenced by the fact that as the persistence of the
underlying government spending shock is reduced, the autocorrelations of the
three tax rates decrease accordingly, as well as the tax rates’ volatilities. Con-
versely, for the case of productivity shock, a less persistent shock brought no
corresponding reduction in the tax rates’ volatilities and no comparably ob-
vious changes in the tax rates’ autocorrelations tracking the change in the
shock’s persistence.
The case of government spending shock also differs from productivity shock
in that the low-income household does not receive a different tax treatment
from the rest of households. When a positive spending shock hits the gov-
ernment, for example, and the government needs to raise taxes to finance its
increased spending, it does so for all three tax rates. It might seem that the
Ramsey planner only provides fiscal buffer to the low-income household in the
case of productivity shock and not in the case of government spending shock.
Nonetheless, analysis of the impulse response functions of consumptions and
welfares of the three households shows that under both shocks the low-income
household’s private consumption and welfare are subjected to smaller changes
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in percentage terms than the other two households. Thus, the optimal taxa-
tion response by the Ramsey planner under government spending shock still
involves subjecting the low-income household to less variability in consumption
and welfare (so during contracting business cycles the low-income household
experiences less dramatic declines in consumption and welfare). This is also
born out by the dynamics of labor. The low-income household’s hours worked
display essentially the same positive relation with welfare (or private consump-
tion) as in the case of productivity shock: a positive (negative) shock to gov-
ernment spending would shrink the household’s consumption, putting negative
pressure on the household’s welfare, but it also tends to lower the household’s
hours worked, thus providing a positive push to welfare. Hence, it is due to the
different nature of government spending shock from productivity shock that
the dynamics of the low-income household’s tax differ between the two shocks,
but the overall effect of the Ramsey optimal taxation on the low-income house-
hold is still to bring out a large substitution effect on the household’s labor,
and use it to moderate the shock’s impact on the household’s welfare.
The case of running the model economy under two shocks shows that the
overall optimal tax results would depend on the relative strengths of the two
shocks. In our analysis, a 0.9% GDP standard error for the government con-
sumption spending stochastic process brings about a much larger response
from the Ramsey optimal taxation regime. So under this baseline calibration,
the tax results for both shocks together very much take on the characteristics
of an optimal tax regime under government spending shock.
Our framework also brings to light the required dynamics of government in-
vestment spending (and hence of the stock of public goods) under the Ramsey
optimal tax regime. To optimally provide public goods to the households, the
Ramsey planner requires government investment to be highly variable over the
business cycles and virtually uncorrelated with output and underlying shocks.
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This has the effect of maintaining a stable stock of public goods and mini-
mizing the shocks’ impact on the households’ welfares coming from changes in
the public goods level. The result is that under either shock the percentage
standard deviation of the stock of public goods is only around 0.3%. For a sep-
arable specification of private and public consumptions, this appears to be the
optimal strategy for the Ramsey planner in terms of public goods provision.
In section 5.4 we will consider the outcome of optimal public goods provision
when private and public consumptions are non-separable.
Another relevant dynamic unearthed by the model is the relationship be-
tween public goods provision and government debt under the Ramsey optimal
taxation regime. Under productivity shock alone, government debt has a neg-
ative correlation with both output and government investment spending, while
under government spending shock alone, it is positively correlated with output
but negatively correlated with government investment spending. Again the
debt dynamics among the three households are far from homogeneous. Most
consistent is the high positive correlation between the high-income household’s
debt with output and the high negative correlation between the low-income
household’s debt with output. This means that during business cycles expan-
sion the high-income household tends to hold more government debt while the
low-income household tends to decrease its bond holdings.
We also run the model under two alternative calibrations, ones that have
higher values of risk aversion parameters for the households. Table 2 reports
the Ramsey optimal policy results for these two calibrations, where sigma is
calibrated at 2 and 3.5 (the steady state is virtually unaffected, except those
related to marginal utilities of consumption and labor, and to welfares). What
immediately stands out is that the effective income tax is now negatively corre-
lated with output and productivity, more highly so with higher risk aversion.
This is mostly contributed by the higher negative correlations between the
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mid-income tax rate and productivity/output, and the lower positive corre-
lations between the low-income tax rate and productivity/output. The tax
rates’ volatilities however do not vary monotonically with the risk aversion
parameter, such that at sigma=3.5 they are all less variable over the business
cycles than at sigma=2. It should also be remarked that at both sigma=2
and 3.5, the volatility of the high-income tax decreases compared to sigma=1,
while volatilities of the two lower-income taxes are higher than when sigma=1.
These changes in the optimal taxation dynamics reflect the different costs
to welfare that would result from changes in consumption and labor due to
the different curvatures of the utility function at higher values of the risk
aversion parameter. The interpretation is that the tax burden on the high-
income household is lessened, evidenced by its tax rate’s lower volatility and
the movement of its correlation with output towards positive territory. The
burden on the mid-income household on the other hand increases. An impor-
tant factor to consider is that at high values of risk aversion, with non-separable
consumption-labor utility, the contribution of labor to welfare fluctuations be-
comes much larger, as only slightly different levels of hours worked mean vastly
different marginal (dis)utility of labor. Though not reported here, our simu-
lation results show that as the risk aversion parameter gets larger, the hours
worked of all three households become more and more highly positively corre-
lated with their own consumptions and welfares. Again, the volatility of the
low-income household’s hours worked is the highest; together with their pro-
cyclicality, this contributes to the dampening of the low-income household’s
welfare as desired by the Ramsey planner. At the same time this dampen-
ing effect on welfare coming from labor becomes more important for the two
upper-income households as well, despite the different tax dynamics especially
for the mid-income household. In addition, as the risk aversion gets larger,
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Table 3.2: Ramsey optimal taxes with different risk aversion
Sigma=2 Sigma=3.5
High income tax
%StdDev 2.52 1.56
Corr with output -0.2249 0.1475
Corr with shock(s) -0.0473 0.3512
Auto-correlation 0.4488 0.9009
Mid income tax
%StdDev 5.88 5.74
Corr with output -0.8384 -0.8562
Corr with shock(s) -0.7701 -0.8737
Autocorrelation 0.9198 0.9585
Low income tax
%StdDev 13.98 12.08
Corr with output 0.2061 0.1626
Corr with shock(s) 0.2290 0.1421
Autocorrelation 0.1729 0.2641
Effective income tax
%StdDev 5.62 4.04
Corr with output -0.1811 -0.2358
Corr with shock(s) -0.1119 -0.2284
Autocorrelation 0.2860 0.5604
Gov inv spending
%StdDev 14.55 19.62
Corr with output 0.1152 0.4890
Corr with shock(s) 0.1661 0.5674
Autocorrelation -0.1123 0.3931
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hours worked for the three households become more volatile. Together with
their increasingly more positive correlation with output/productivity, it is clear
that the welfare costs of changing labor patterns become a lot more important
at high risk aversion values, and the Ramsey planner has to engineer a tax
regime so that the labor responses of the households move together with their
consumptions to help dampen the shocks’ impact on in their welfares. With
this tax policy, therefore, the households’ responses in terms of labor are de-
termined overwhelmingly by the substitution effect.
The dynamics of government investment spending also change. It becomes
more volatile and more positively correlated with output and productivity, the
higher the risk aversion, so that at σ = 3.5 these correlations become highly
positive. Consequentially, higher risk aversion also has the effect of making the
stock of public goods more volatile. It is apparent that the higher curvature
of the utility function causes the trade-off in the Ramsey planner’s optimiza-
tion of social welfare to be skewed more towards maintaining the portion of
households’ welfare that comes from private consumption and labor, so much
so that the planner lets the component of social welfare coming from public
goods consumption fluctuate more than she would do so at σ = 1.
As has been shown, the curvature of the utility function plays an impor-
tant role in determining the properties of the Ramsey optimal taxation regime.
However, essential heterogeneity in the tax dynamics among the three house-
holds remains.
3.5 Sensitivity Analyses of Optimal Taxes
3.5.1 Household’s Abilities
It is expected that the households’ abilities (represented by their labor pro-
ductivities in the model) play an important role in determining the optimal
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Figure 3.1: Sensitivity to Lower Income Ability
tax results. In this section we assess how sensitive our results are to changes
in these abilities. We simulated the model with each of the three abilities ad-
justed to 0.8 and 1.2 times their baseline values. Figures 1 to 3 plot the results
of this exercise.
The striking result is that only for the low-income tax rate does a decrease
in the household’s ability lead to an increase in the tax rate’s volatility. The
opposite happens for the mid-income and high-income tax rates. In terms
of sensitivity, the low-income tax rate displays highest sensitivity to changes
in the household’s ability. Again, this is tied mostly to the fact that the
low-income household’s consumption point is situated at a higher marginal
utility than the two-upper income households. Any changes in the household’s
income-earning ability have a direct impact on the household’s consumption
and would cause large fluctuation in its welfare. This necessitates higher fiscal
adjustment on the part of the Ramsey planner.
These results point strongly to the different treatment that the Ram-
sey planner has for the low-income household in terms of the optimal taxes
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Figure 3.2: Sensitivity to Middle Income Ability
Figure 3.3: Sensitivity to Higher Income Ability
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to levy. As the correlations between the tax rates and output/productivity
do not change drastically (not reported here), the interpretation is that, as
the low-income household’s income-earning ability gets lower, the household
needs more active fiscal intervention from the Ramsey planner to smooth the
shock’s impact. More active intervention in this case would simply mean larger
changes to the low-income tax rate whenever a change in productivity occurs,
to dampen fluctuations in the household’s consumption and welfare. On the
other hand, since the correlations of mid-income and high-income tax rates
with output are of the reverse sign to that of low-income tax rate and output,
lower income-earning abilities for these households cause the opposite reaction
from the Ramsey planner. Lower incomes translate to lower consumptions for
these two households, thus, e.g. when productivity shrinks, the Ramsey plan-
ner cannot afford to engineer as large reductions in their consumptions (thus
welfares) to buffer the low-income household as at higher abilities, as the costs
to overall welfare would be too great. The result is smaller variations in their
tax rates in response to changing productivity.
Throughout all these changes to households’ labor productivity, the Ram-
sey planner keeps the dynamics of government investment spending and stock
of public goods essentially the same. Government investment spending is kept
virtually acyclical, and the stock of public goods shows very small variability.
3.5.2 Weight of Public Goods in Households’ Utility
Functions
In this section, we assess the importance of public goods provision to the dy-
namics of optimal tax policy seen in section 4. To do that, we varied the weight
of public goods consumption in the households’ utility function. In doing so we
made the Ramsey planner place varied degrees of importance on the optimal
provision of public goods. Table 3 reports the findings (productivity shock
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only).
It is apparent that a large part of the optimal policy’s variability is at-
tributed to the consideration of public goods provision. When psi is very
small, the results approach those of CCK (94), that is, the tax rates vary lit-
tle with productivity changes. Furthermore, the correlations between the tax
rates and output/productivity can change in sign and magnitude quite dramat-
ically. At such small value of psi, the Ramsey planner’s overriding objective
is to optimize social welfare based on just the households’ private consump-
tion and labor. Without public goods provision in the planner’s objective,
the mid-income household becomes the main provider in tax revenues to bring
balance to the government budget constraint, while both the low-income and
high-income households both benefit from pro-cyclical tax rates. The lower
volatilities of the tax rates reflect the fact that there is no longer as much
pressing need to keep up tax revenues for the maintenance of the stock of
public goods. Indeed, at ψ = 0.05, government investment spending becomes
highly pro-cyclical. As a result, the percentage standard deviation of the stock
of public goods jumps to 15% (compared to just 0.03% for the baseline cal-
ibration), and the stock of public goods becomes almost perfectly positively
correlated with output. This public goods has become more or less another
component of government spending similar to consumption spending, and the
Ramsey planner has no interest in keeping it stable for social welfare maxi-
mization; she simply invests more or less in it according to the fluctuations
in the business cycles. The smaller need for tax revenues also explains the
results in that it is sufficient for the Ramsey planner to target the mid-income
household for its tax-smoothing purpose, while the cost to welfare of including
the high-income household in the tax-smoothing scheme outweighs the benefit.
When psi gets higher, the curvature of the log-utility coming from public
goods consumption becomes higher as well; any fluctuations in the level of
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Table 3.3: Sensitivity Analysis to Public Good Substitution Importance
ψ = 0.05 ψ = 0.4 ψ = 2.0
High income tax
%StdDev 1.54 2.93 3.02
Corr with output 0.5938 -0.4539 -0.1235
Corr with shock(s) 0.6257 -0.1917 0.0684
Mid income tax
%StdDev 1.68 5.32 4.89
Corr with output -0.5305 -0.7307 -0.4040
Corr with shock(s) -0.4964 -0.4998 -0.1945
Low income tax
%StdDev 5.82 10.75 11.94
Corr with output 0.5920 0.2849 0.5418
Corr with shock(s) 0.5133 0.4201 0.6033
Effective income tax
%StdDev 2.28 4.98 5.35
Corr with output 0.4520 -0.1907 0.1845
Corr with shock(s) 0.4136 0.0307 0.3273
Gov inv spending
%StdDev 40.60 13.00 9.93
Corr with output 0.8285 -0.0958 0.0206
Corr with shock(s) 0.8241 0.1038 0.0379
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public goods cause greater changes to social welfare. The Ramsey planner’s
focus thus shifts more towards maintaining a stable stock of public goods. The
result is that government investment spending quickly becomes less volatile
and moves towards acyclicality, and the volatility of the stock of public goods
decreases, so that at ψ = 2, compared to the baseline calibration there is
about 30% reduction in percentage standard deviation (the steady-state level
of public goods stays largely the same). At the same time, the stronger impact
of public goods on social welfare also forces the Ramsey planner to effect
smaller changes to the part of household’s utility that comes from private
consumption and labor. This brings about the necessary changes in the optimal
tax dynamics observed in the fourth column. The burden on the upper-income
households is reduced slightly, while there is an increased buffer for the low-
income household. Nonetheless, the essential characteristics of the Ramsey
optimal tax regime in the context of public goods provision do not change.
3.5.3 Separable Utility for Consumption and Leisure
In this section we investigate the properties of Ramsey-optimal taxation in
the case where the households? consumption and leisure are separable in
their utility function. Concretely, we use the following specification of utility
function
ζlog
(
Cjt
)
+ (1− ζ) log
(
1−Hjt
)
+ ψlog (Lt) (3.25)
where ζ is calibrated at 0.3. The results are displayed in table 4, after a
slight re-calibration to keep the income streams close to the baseline calibra-
tion. Even though the key ratios and moments are kept in line with their U.S.
empirical counterparts as in the baseline calibration, the steady-state values
of certain variables necessarily change, such as those of consumptions, stock
of public goods, and labors. The values of welfares and marginal utilities
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of consumption and labor also move because of this different form of utility
function.
In the case of technological shock, the negative correlation between output
and the two higher-income tax rates becomes lower in magnitude, while the
low-income tax rate becomes more positively correlated with output. As a
result the effective tax now has a more significantly positive correlation with
output and with the underlying shock. The tax-smoothing burden on the
mid-income household has been significantly reduced (the high-income house-
hold to a lesser extent), while the Keynesian characteristics of the low-income
household’s tax rate becomes more pronounced.
Together with the changes in their volatilities, it is clear that the optimal
tax regime is less active with regards to the two upper-income households,
but more so with respect to the low-income household. As we can recall from
section 4, the optimal change in social welfare in response to productivity shock
is achieved by ensuring a minimal drop in the low-income household’s utility
by engendering the appropriate drops in the two higher-income households’
welfare.
The changed tax dynamics therefore tell us that with this particular spec-
ification of private consumption and labor utility, the impact of the shock on
the households’ welfare is more pronounced, and correspondingly the Ram-
sey planner has to reduce the fiscal burden on the upper-income households
while increasing the buffer for the low-income household. This can be ex-
plained in terms of the contribution of labor’s utility to the welfares of the
three households. A separable private consumption-labor utility results in
marginal (dis)utilities of labor for the three households that are closer to-
gether than they are under the baseline calibration. Without the influence of
private consumption level on the curvature of labor utility, the contribution
of changes in labor to fluctuations in welfare diminishes. Correspondingly the
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Table 3.4: Results with fully separable utility
Prod shock gov spending
only shock only
High income tax
%StdDev 2.90 15.86
Corr with output -0.1013 -0.5060
Corr with shock(s) 0.1441 0.9807
Mid income tax
%StdDev 4.52 25.49
Corr with output -0.2840 -0.5235
Corr with shock(s) -0.0155 0.9831
Low income tax
%StdDev 12.69 29.76
Corr with output 0.5935 -0.4439
Corr with shock(s) 0.6811 0.9312
Effective income tax
%StdDev 5.42 22.60
Corr with output 0.2830 -0.4937
Corr with shock(s) 0.4637 0.9711
Gov inv spending
%StdDev 6.97 9.52
Corr with output 0.0118 -0.0160
Corr with shock(s) 0.0268 -0.0152
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Ramsey planner places less importance on using labor to moderate the im-
pact of shocks on welfares. For the low-income household, this is shown by
a strongly less positive correlation between the low-income household’s labor
and private consumption (or welfare) compared to the baseline case, which
speaks of a smaller dampening effect on the household’s welfare contributed
by changes in labor decision. The Ramsey planner has to apply a more ac-
tive pro-cyclical tax to the low-income household to provide a stronger buffet
through private consumption. For the two upper-income households, as the
Ramsey planner is no longer able to moderate the effects of counter-cyclical
taxes on their consumptions effectively with changes in their labor decisions,
she has to reduce the counter-cyclicality as well as the responsiveness of their
taxes.
In the case of government spending shock, there is a small reduction in the
volatilities of all three tax rates, and they get slightly less negatively related to
output. This means a less active optimal tax regime in response to government
spending shock that applies to all three households. This is also explained
through the contribution of labor to welfare as above. The difference from
productivity shock is that, for this shock the low-income tax has the same
cyclicality as the other two taxes. So, given the diminished influence of changes
in labor on welfare, the tax regime for the low-income has to be less active as
well. This is born out by the same statistics that the low-income household’s
hours worked become less positively correlated with its private consumption
(or welfare).
The dynamics of government investment spending also changes in that it
becomes less volatile under both shocks compared to the baseline calibration.
But this is attributed mostly to the fact that the steady-state stock of public
goods has become lower in the new calibration. The important point is that
it remains essentially acyclical, so that the stock of public goods varies by less
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than 0.2% from its steady-state value under either shock. Thus, under this
alternative specification of the utility function, the objective of optimal public
goods provision still has the same outcome as under the baseline calibration.
Overall, the main characteristics of the optimal tax dynamics are not al-
tered. There remains heterogeneity among the three households in terms of
the taxes they pay, with the low-income household standing out strongly from
the other two households in the case of productivity shock. And under either
shock, responses of the low-income household’s consumption and welfare are
more muted. In order to maximize social welfare and optimally provide pub-
lic goods service, the Ramsey planner still follows essentially a tax-smoothing
regime coupled with dampening the effects of the business cycles variations on
the low-income household.
3.5.4 Non - Separable Utility
In this section we investigate the properties of Ramsey-optimal taxation in the
case where the households’ private consumption and public goods consumption
are non-separable in the utility function. Concretely, we use the following
specification of utility function
U
(
Cjt , H
j
t , L
j
t
)
=
(
Cjt + ψlog
(
Ljt
) (
1−Hjt
)1−σ)
1− σ (3.26)
where σ is kept at 0.99 and ψ is calibrated at 0.1. This is a value chosen
to keep the consumption patterns of the three households close to the base-
line calibration while keeping the share of public goods in the utility function
significant. Higher values of ψ would depress their consumption levels to the
point of turning negative in the steady state. The results are displayed in table
5, after a slight re-calibration to keep the income streams close to the baseline
calibration. The key ratios and moments are also kept as in line with their
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U.S. empirical counterparts as in the baseline calibration.
It is clear that the responsiveness of the Ramsey optimal policy decreases
quite noticeably for both shocks. The tax rates’ volatilities are all lower com-
pared to the baseline calibration, especially for the low-income household.
Also, in the case of productivity shock, the counter-cyclicality of the two upper-
income tax rates increases, while the pro-cyclicality of the low-income tax rate
decreases. The outcome of Ramsey optimal tax policy with regards to opti-
mal provision of public goods also changes. Government investment becomes
more positively correlated with output/underlying shocks for both shocks. As
a result, the stock of public goods fluctuates a lot more than it does under the
baseline calibration (at a percentage standard deviation of 4 ? 5%, compared
to around 0.3% for the baseline calibration).
With non-separable private-public consumptions, the level of public goods
plays a direct role in determining the households’ marginal utilities of con-
sumption. With public consumption now added to private consumption, the
marginal utilities of consumption across the households are all lower compared
to the baseline case. This has the general effect of moderating the impact
of shocks on consumptions and on welfares, thus the generally less active tax
regime indicated by lower volatilities of the tax rates. In the case of produc-
tivity shock, what this means for the Ramsey planner is that the low-income
household does not need as strong a buffer against the shock’s impact, which
results in a less variable and less pro-cyclical tax policy for the household. The
mid- and high-income also benefit from smaller changes to their tax rates in
response to changing productivity. And under government spending shocks,
all three households are subjected to a less variable tax regime.
Concerning public goods consumption, a barely moving level of public
goods may no longer be optimal to welfare. As discussed before, the trade-
off for the Ramsey planner is to balance between a stable provision of public
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Table 3.5: Results with non-separable utility
Prod shock Gov spending
only shock only
High income tax
%StdDev 2.06 16.08
Corr with output -0.3480 -0.6421
Corr with shock(s) -0.3239 0.9853
Mid income tax
%StdDev 4.85 23.28
Corr with output -0.7049 -0.6272
Corr with shock(s) -0.6584 0.9866
Low income tax
%StdDev 6.68 28.87
Corr with output 0.2246 -0.5744
Corr with shock(s) 0.1059 0.9595
Effective income tax
%StdDev 3.53 21.82
Corr with output -0.2774 -0.6147
Corr with shock(s) -0.3127 0.9798
Gov inv spending
%StdDev 19.04 15.07
Corr with output 0.5227 0.2430
Corr with shock(s) 0.5675 0.6117
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goods and minimizing the impact of the needed tax policy on households’ con-
sumptions. Given the lower marginal utilities of consumption in this case,
maintaining a stock of public goods as stable as before would require a tax
policy that is more aggressive than necessary. To the Ramsey planner, a more
volatile stock of public goods could be entertained as long as it can be bal-
anced with smaller impacts on private consumption and labor given the right
tax policy. The less active tax regime and the more volatile stock of public
goods seen here are thus the result of this consideration, indicating the shift in
the planner’s priority towards less fiscal intervention. With less emphasis on
maintaining a stable stock of public goods across the business cycles, govern-
ment investment spending becomes pro-cyclical, as the Ramsey planner lets
public goods maintenance be dictated more by the fluctuations in output.
Another way to understand the impact of non-separable private-public con-
sumption is to look at the relationship between consumptions and the stock
of public goods. Since what goes into the households’ utility functions is the
current stock of public goods (i.e. it is predetermined at the start of a period),
it is rather misleading to read into the correlation between the stock of pub-
lic goods and the consumption variables as reported in Dynare. Rather, it is
more instructive to look at the policy functions of the households’ consump-
tion variables, more specifically the coefficients of the current stock of public
goods in these policy functions. Compared to the baseline calibration, there is
a clear reversal in sign of these coefficients. When the utility of public goods
consumption is separable, these coefficients are positive. Conversely they are
negative under the non-separable specification. The compensating effect of
public goods consumption is very clear: it dampens the responses of private
consumptions.
The overall implication for the Ramsey planner is that when public and
private consumptions are non-separable in the utility, she needs not pursue an
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aggressive optimal tax regime to maintain a stable stock of public goods, and
government investment spending can be let to follow the business cycles (to a
certain degree).
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper we provided a quantitative treatment of the issue of optimal tax
policy in the context of heterogeneous households and public good provision.
We furthered the literature in two main ways, first by bringing optimal pub-
lic goods provision into a stochastic, quantitative framework with aggregate
shocks, and second by providing a detailed look at the heterogeneity of the
optimal tax policy across households of different income groups.
We calibrated the model economy to broadly match the macro character-
istics of the US economy and solved for the Ramsey optimal equilibrium with
the households’ tax rates as optimizing instruments. We obtained the dy-
namic properties of optimal taxes across the business cycles, and found several
illuminating implications.
The Ramsey planner is highly active in managing changes to the income
tax rates in response to technological shock and government spending shock,
and seems to follow a tax-smoothing fiscal regime. Furthermore, she does not
prescribe the same optimal tax plan to all three households in the model. There
is considerable heterogeneity across the households in terms of their tax rates’
variability and correlation with the underlying shocks and with output. The
optimal tax implication in the case of productivity shock is that the middle-
income and high-income households shoulder most of the tax-smoothing regime
desired by the Ramsey planner, while the low-income household gets rather
the Keynesian tax treatment. The government spending shock on the other
hand requires the three households’ tax rates have the same cyclicality with
output/underlying shock. Nonetheless there remains a similarity between the
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two cases of shocks, in that there is buffer for the low-income household to
minimize the impact of shocks on its welfare, and the household’s labor dy-
namics contribute to this buffering. Optimal provision of public goods requires
that the Ramsey planner provide government investment spending that is es-
sentially uncorrelated with output/underlying shocks, so that fluctuations in
the stock of public goods are kept to a minimum across the business cycles.
Our sensitivity analyses highlighted the importance of public goods con-
sumption in the households’ utility function in the optimal tax results obtained
in the baseline calibration. Without public goods consumption/provision, in
the case of productivity shock, the Ramsey optimal tax regime becomes much
less responsive to shock, and the stock of public goods is left to fluctuate sig-
nificantly and in almost perfect positive correlation with output. Alternative
specifications of the utility function also have the effects of modifying slightly
the tax dynamics of the three households. A separable private consumption-
leisure utility lessens the contribution of labor (dis)utility to welfare. Conse-
quently the Ramsey optimal tax policy is modified to relieve the tax-smoothing
burden on the upper-income households while at the same time giving the low-
income more assistance. A non-separable private-public consumption has the
effect of shifting the Ramsey planner’s trade-off more towards reducing the tax
regime’s responsiveness and letting the stock of public goods fluctuate more.
With households’ marginal utilities of consumption reduced by the presence
of public goods, there is no longer as much a need to have an aggressive fis-
cal intervention to keep the stock of public goods stable as suggested by the
results of the baseline calibration. Lastly, in the case of productivity shock,
the low-income tax rate’s volatility increases with decreases in the household’s
labor productivity, while the reverse happens for the two upper-income house-
holds. This again highlights the central result of the Ramsey optimal taxation
regime, in that the Ramsey planner subjects the low-income household to a
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different tax treatment so as to buffer it against the impact of shocks.
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Conclusion
This dissertation studied
(i) The financial cycle and the inter-linkages of the financial system and the
real economy. The model proposed in the dissertation matches empirical
cyclical properties of financial conditions as measured by credit spreads.
(ii) Bank monitoring over the business cycle. The model proposed in chapter
2 showed that banks choose to spend less on monitoring during benign
business conditions potentially causing build up of poor lending.
(iii) Optimal taxes under financial frictions. The model in chapter 3 shows
that income for financially constrained households are procyclical for
lower income households and more acyclical for higher income house-
holds.
Further work in understanding financial factors will have to address some
recent features of financing in the economy:
(i) The rise of direct finance: Benign financing conditions since 2002 has
led to an increasing prevalence of corporations tapping savers directly.
This is a huge shift for financial intermediation whose role in direct fi-
nancing is limited to underwriting and initial sale of bonds. This means
that banks no longer perform traditional functions of intermediation in-
cluding monitoring and screening. Figure 3.4 shows corporate bonds
outstanding as a fraction of bonds and bank debt outstanding over time.
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Figure 3.4: Chart showing share of corporate bonds outstanding divided by
the sum of outstanding bank commercial and industrial loans and corporate
bonds outstanding. Data from Federal Reserve Flow of Funds release.
(ii) Securitization: Increasing securitization, where banks sell their loan
portfolios to investors, also undermines traditional functions of banking.
(iii) The rise of offshore direct finance: Shin (2013), in a speech at the
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, highlighted the risks arising from
the surge in offshore direct financing. Emerging market corporations
and banks are increasingly turning to offshore markets to tap into easy
monetary conditions abroad. Offshore bond issuance is a source of easy
money. This exposes emerging markets to financial risks from exchange
rate movements and changes in monetary policy abroad.
(iv) Sustained current account imbalances: Global waves of liquidity
arising from large and persistent current account imbalances have con-
tributed to financial instability and disinflationary pressures. Countries
with large current account deficits and surpluses remain vulnerable to
external shocks.
(v) Credit conditions and jobless recoveries: There are some theories
about why modern global recession recoveries see slow job creation. For
instance, Koenders and Rogerson (2005) argue that firms wait for reces-
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sions to layoff excess staff hired during long cyclical boom phases of the
business cycle. On the other hand, financing conditions may also affect
job creation. Jermann and Quadrini (2012) look at liquidity constraints
resulting in firms laying off workers. Further work could examine the
influence of credit conditions in job creation.
110
Bibliography
[1] Adrian, T., and Shin, H. S. (2010a). Liquidity and Leverage. Journal of
Financial Intermediation, 19(3), 418-437.
[2] Adrian, T., and Shin, H. S. (2010b). Financial Intermediaries and Mon-
etary Economics. Handbook of Monetary Economics, 3, 601-650.
[3] An, S., and Schorfheide, F. (2007). Bayesian Analysis of DSGE Models.
Econometric Reviews, 26(2), 113-172.
[4] Angeletos, G. M., and La’O, J. (2013). Sentiments. Econometrica, 81(2),
739-779.
[5] Atkinson, A., and Stern N. (1974). Pigou, Taxation and Public Goods.
The Review of Economic Studies 41(1)
[6] Atkinson, A., and Stiglitz J. (1976). The Design of Tax Structure: Direct
Versus Indirect Insurance. Journal of Public Economics 6(1)
[7] Barro, R. (1990). Government Spending in a Simple Model of Endoge-
nous Growth. Journal of Political Economy
[8] Benigno, P., and Woodford M. (2004). Optimal Monetary and Fiscal
Policy: A Linear-Quadratic Approach. NBER Macroeconomics Annual
2003. The MIT Press
111
[9] Berglof, E., and von Thadden, E. L. (1994). Short-Term Versus Long-
Term Interests: Capital Structure with Multiple Investors. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 109(4), 1055-84.
[10] Bernanke, B. S., Gertler, M., and Gilchrist, S. (1999). The Financial
Accelerator in a Quantitative Business Cycle Framework. Handbook of
Macroeconomics, 1, 1341-1393.
[11] Bianchi, J. (2011). Overborrowing and Systemic Externalities in the
Business Cycle. American Economic Review, 101, 3400-3426.
[12] Blanchard, O., and Perotti R. (2002). An Empirical Characterization Of
The Dynamic Effects Of Changes in Government Spending and Taxes
on Output. The Quarterly Journal of Economics
[13] Boissay, F., Collard, F., and Smets, F. (2013). Booms and Systemic
Banking Crises. European Central Bank Working Paper No. 1514.
[14] Borio C., and Lowe, P. (2002). Asset Prices, Financial and Monetary Sta-
bility: Exploring the Nexus. Bank for International Settlements Working
Paper No. 114.
[15] Borio, C., and Zhu, H. (2012). Capital regulation, risk-taking and mon-
etary policy: a missing link in the transmission mechanism? Journal of
Financial Stability, 8(4), 236-251.
[16] Broadway, R., and Keen M. (1993). Public Goods, Self-Selection and
Optimal Income Taxation. International Economic Review
[17] Brunnermeier M., and Sannikov, Y. (in press). A Macroeconomic Model
with a Financial Sector. The American Economic Review.
[18] Canova, F. (2007). Methods for applied macroeconomic research (Vol.
13). Princeton University Press.
112
[19] Cerqueiro, G., Ongena, S., and Roszbach, K. In press. Collateralization,
Bank Loan Rates, and Monitoring. The Journal of Finance.
[20] Chari, V. V., Christiano L. J., and Kehoe P. (1994). Optimal Fiscal
Policy in a Business Cycle Model. Journal of Political Economy 102(4)
[21] Christiano, L. J., and Ikeda, D. (2011). Government Policy, Credit Mar-
kets and Economic Activity. National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper No. w17142.
[22] Christiano, L. J., Eichenbaum, M. S., and Trabandt, M. (2013). Unem-
ployment and Business Cycles. (No. w19265). National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research Working Paper.
[23] Christiano, L. J., Eichenbaum, M., and Evans, C. L. (2005). Nominal
Rigidities and the Dynamic Effects of a Shock to Monetary Policy. Jour-
nal of Political Economy, 113(1), 1-45.
[24] Christiano, L. J., Motto R., and Rostagno M. (2014). Risk Shocks. The
American Economic Review, 104.1, 27-65.
[25] Christiano, L. J., Motto R., and Rostagno, M. (2010). Financial Factors
in Business Cycles. European Central Bank Working Paper No 1192.
[26] Coenan, G., Straub R., and Trabandt M. (2011). Fiscal Policy and the
Great Recession in the Euro Area, European Central Bank Working Pa-
per
[27] Curdia, V., and Woodford, M. (2010). Credit Spreads and Monetary
Policy. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 42(1), 3-35.
[28] Dang, T. V., Gorton, G., Holmstrom, B., and Ordonez, G. (2014). Banks
as Secret Keepers (No. w20255). National Bureau of Economic Research
Working Paper.
113
[29] Diamond, D. W. (1984). Financial Intermediation and Delegated Moni-
toring. The Review of Economic Studies, 51, 393-414.
[30] Diamond, D. W., and Rajan, R. G. (2000). A Theory of Bank Capital.
The Journal of Finance, 55(6), 2431-2465.
[31] Diamond, D. W., and Rajan, R. G. (2012). Illiquid Banks, Financial
Stability, and Interest Rate Policy. Journal of Political Economy, 120,
552-591.
[32] Diamond, P., and Mirrlees J. (1971). Optimal Taxation and Public Pro-
duction I: Production Efficiency. The American Economic Review 61(1)
[33] Dubey, P., Geanakoplos, J., and Shubik, M. (2005). Default and Punish-
ment in General Equilibrium. Econometrica, 73.1, 1-37.
[34] Farhi, E., and Tirole, J. (2012). Bubbly liquidity. The Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, 79(2), 678-706.
[35] Fostel, A., and Geanakoplos, J. (2008). Leverage Cycles and the Anxious
Economy. The American Economic Review, 98(4), 1211-1244.
[36] Gali J. (2008). Monetary Policy, Inflation, and the Business Cycle.
Princeton University Press
[37] Gali, J. Lopez-Salido D., and Valles J. (2007). Understanding the Effects
of Government Spending on Consumption. Journal of the European Eco-
nomic Association
[38] Gambacorta, L., and Mistrulli, P. E. (2004). Does Bank Capital Affect
Lending Behavior?. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 13(4), 436-457.
[39] Geanakoplos, J. (2011). What’s Missing From Macroeconomics: Endoge-
nous Leverage and Default. Cowles Foundation Working Paper no. 1332
114
[40] Geithner, T. (2014). Stress test: reflections on financial crises. Random
House.
[41] Gertler, M., and Karadi, P. (2011). A Model of Unconventional Monetary
Policy. Journal of Monetary Economics, 58(1), 17-34.
[42] Gertler, M., and Kiyotaki, N. (2010). Financial Intermediation and
Credit Policy in Business Cycle Analysis. Handbook of Monetary Eco-
nomics, 3, 547-599.
[43] Gorton, G., and Kahn, J. (2000). The Design of Bank Loan Contracts.
Review of Financial Studies, 13(2), 331-364.
[44] Gorton, G., and Winton, A. (2003). Financial Intermediation. Handbook
of the Economics of Finance, 1, 431-552.
[45] Guerrieri, V., and Lorenzoni, G. (2012). Credit crises, precautionary sav-
ings, and the liquidity trap (No. w17583). National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper.
[46] Head, K., Mayer, T., and Thoenig, M. (2014). Welfare and Trade without
Pareto. The American Economic Review 104.5, 310-316.
[47] Holmstrom, B., and Tirole, J. (1997). Financial Intermediation, Loanable
Funds, and the Real Sector. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(3),
663-691.
[48] Hoon, H. T., and Phelps, E. S. (2008). Future Fiscal and Budgetary
Shocks. Journal of Economic Theory, 143(1), 499-518.
[49] Jermann, U., and Quadrini, V. (2012). Macroeconomic Effects of Finan-
cial Shocks. The American Economic Review, 102(1), 238-271.
[50] Jime´nez G., Ongena, S., Peydro, J., Saurina, J. (2014). Hazardous Times
for Monetary Policy: What Do Twenty-Three Million Bank Loans Say
115
About the Effects of Monetary Policy on Credit Risk-Taking? Econo-
metrica, 82.2, 463-505.
[51] Jime´nez G., Ongena, S., Peydro, J., Saurina, J. (2014). Macroprudential
Policy, Countercyclical Bank Capital Buffers and Credit Supply: Evi-
dence from the Spanish Dynamic Provisioning Experiments. European
Banking Center Discussion Paper No. 2012-011.
[52] Jones, L., Manuelli R., and Rossi P. (1993). Optimal Taxation in Models
of Endogenous Growth. Journal of Political Economy
[53] Judd, K. (1999). Optimal Taxation and Spending in General Competitive
Growth Models. Journal of Public Economics 71(1)
[54] Kiley, M. T., and Sim, J. W. (2012). Intermediary Leverage, Macroeco-
nomic Dynamics, Macroprudential Policy. mimeo, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System.
[55] Kishan, R. P., and Opiela, T. P. (2000). Bank Size, Bank Capital, and the
Bank Lending Channel. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 32(1),
121-141.
[56] Kiyotaki, N., and Moore, J. (1997). Credit Cycles. Journal of Political
Economy, 105(2), 211-248.
[57] Koenders, K., and Rogerson, R. (2005). Organizational Dynamics Over
The Business Cycle: a View on Jobless Recoveries. Federal Reserve Bank
of St. Louis Review, 87.
[58] Ljungqvist, L., and Sargent, T. J. (2004). Recursive Macroeconomic The-
ory. The MIT Press.
116
[59] Longhofer, S. D., and Santos, J. A. (2000). The Importance of Bank
Seniority for Relationship Lending. Journal of Financial Intermediation,
9(1), 57-89.
[60] Lorenzoni, G. (2008). Inefficient Credit Booms. The Review of Economic
Studies, 75(3), 809-833.
[61] Lown, C., and Morgan, D. P. (2006). The Credit Cycle and the Business
Cycle: New Findings Using the Loan Officer Opinion Survey. Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking, 38(6), 1575-1597.
[62] Meh, C. A., and Moran, K. (2010). The Role of Bank Capital in the Prop-
agation of Shocks. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 34(3),
555-576.
[63] Mendoza, E. G. (2010). Sudden Stops, Financial Crises, and Leverage.
The American Economic Review, 100(5), 1941-1966.
[64] Mendoza, E., and Tesar L. (1998). The International Ramifications of
Tax Reforms: Supply Side Economics in a Global Economy. The Amer-
ican Economic Review 88(1)
[65] Monacelli, T. (2009). New Keynesian Models, Durable Goods, and Col-
lateral Constraints. Journal of Monetary Economics
[66] Mountford, A., and Uhlig, H. (2009). What are the Effects of Fiscal
Policy Shocks?. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 24(6), 960-992.
[67] Park, C. (2000). Monitoring and Structure of Debt Contracts. Journal
of Finance, 55(5), 2157-2195.
[68] Paulson H. (2011). On the Brink. Grand Central Publishing
[69] Rajan, R. (2010). Fault Lines. Princeton University Press
117
[70] Rajan, R., and Winton, A. (1995). Covenants and Collateral as Incentives
to Monitor. The Journal of Finance, 50(4), 1113-1146.
[71] Ravenna, F., and Walsh, C. E. (2006). Optimal Monetary Policy With
The Cost Channel. Journal of Monetary Economics, 53(2), 199-216.
[72] Schmitt-Grohe, S., and Uribe M. (2007). Optimal Simple and Imple-
mentable Monetary and Fiscal Rules. Journal of Monetary Economics
[73] Schmitt-Grohe, S., and Uribe, M. (2004). Solving Dynamic General Equi-
librium Models Using a Second-Order Approximation to the Policy Func-
tion. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 28(4), 755-775.
[74] Schmitt-Grohe, S., and Uribe, M. (2012). What’s News In Business Cy-
cles. Econometrica, 80(6), 2733-2764.
[75] Shin, H. (2013). The Second Phase of Global Liquidity and Its Impact on
Emerging Economies. Speech at Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Asia Economic Policy Conference November 2013.
[76] Smets, F., and Wouters, R. (2007). Shocks and Frictions in US Business
Cycles: A Bayesian DSGE Approach. The American Economic Review,
97(3), 586-606.
[77] Sorkin, A. R. (2010). Too Big to Fail: The Inside Story of How Wall
Street and Washington Fought to Save the Financial System and Them-
selves. Penguin
[78] Townsend, R. M. (1979). Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets
with Costly State Verification. Journal of Economic Theory, 21.2 265-
293.
118
[79] Winton, A. (1999). Don’t Put All Your Eggs in One Basket? Diversifica-
tion and Specialization in Lending. Working Paper. Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=173615
[80] Winton, A. (2003). Institutional liquidity Needs and the Structure of
Monitored Finance. Review of Financial Studies, 16(4), 1273-1313.
119
